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Preface
Part 1: Randomized by foolishness
This is a paper that has been written very rapidly in order to respond to a perceived
need of clarity in the quantitative world. The paper subtitle, “How I learned to stop
worrying and love the CDOs” is obviously ironic in referring to the hysteria that has
often characterized accounts of modeling and mathematical finance in part of the press
and the media, and the demonization of part of the market products related to the
crisis, such as CDOs and derivatives more generally. Let us be clear and avoid any
misunderstanding: The crisis is very real, it has caused suffering to many individuals,
families and companies. However, it does not help looking for a scapegoat without
looking at the whole picture with a critical eye. Accounts that try and convince the
public that the whole crisis is due mainly to modeling and to sophisticated and obscure
products being traded are necessarily partial, and to partly righting this perceptive bias
this paper is devoted.
Indeed, the public opinion has been bombarded with so many cliches on derivatives,
modeling and quantitative analysis that we feel a paper offering a little clarity is needed.
And while we are aware that this sounds a little Don Quixotesque, we hope this paper
will help changing the situation. In trying to do so, we need to balance carefully the
perspectives of different readerships. We would like our paper to be attractive to a
relatively general industry and academic public without disappointing the scientific and
technically minded specialists, and at the same time we do not want our paper to be
a best-seller type of publication full of bashing and negatively provocative ideas and
very little actual technical content. All of this while keeping windmills at large1. Hence
we will be walking the razor’s hedge here, in trying to maintain the balance between a
popular account and scientific discourse.
We are not alone in our attempt to bring clarity2. This paper however does so in
an extensive technical way, showing past and present research that is quite relevant
in disproving a number of mis-conceptions on the role of mathematics and quantitative
analysis in relation with the crisis. This paper takes an extensive technical path, starting
with static copulas and ending up with dynamic loss models. Even though our paper is
short, we follow a long path for Credit Derivatives and multi-name credit derivatives in
particular, focusing on Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). What are CDOs? To
describe the simplest possible CDO, say a synthetic CDO on the corporate market, we
1The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote of La Mancha, 1605 and 1615.
2See primarily Shreve, S. (2008), Don’t Blame the Quants, Forbes Commentary, but also, for example,
Donnelly, C., and Embrechts, P. (2009), The devil is in the tails: actuarial mathematics and the subprime
mortgage crisis, accepted for publication in the ASTIN Bulletin. Giorgio Szego (2009), the Crash Sonata
in D Major (to appear in the Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions), gives a much
broader overview of the crisis with some critical insight that is helpful in clarifying the more common
misconceptions
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can proceed as follows.
We are given a portfolio of names, say 125 names for example. The names may
default, generating losses to investors exposed to those names. In a CDO tranche there
are two parties, a protection buyer and a protection seller. A tranche is a portion of the
loss of the portfolio between two percentages. For example, the 3-6% tranche focuses
on the losses between 3% (attachment point) and 6% (detachment point). Roughly
speaking, the protection seller agrees to pay to the buyer all notional default losses
(minus the recoveries) in the portfolio whenever they occur due to one or more defaults
of the entities, within 3% and 6% of the total pool loss. In exchange for this, the buyer
pays the seller a periodic fee on the notional given by the portion of the tranche that is
still “alive” in each relevant period.
In a sense, CDOs look like contracts selling (or buying) insurance on portions of the
loss of a portfolio. The valuation problem is trying and determining the fair price of this
insurance.
The crucial observation here is that “tranching” is a non-linear operation. When
computing the price (mark to market) of a tranche at a point in time, one has to take
the expectation of the future tranche losses under the pricing measure. Since the tranche
is a nonlinear function of the loss, the expectation will depend on all moments of the
loss and not just on the expected loss. If we look at the single names in the portfolio,
the loss distribution of the portfolio is characterized by the marginal distributions of the
single names defaults and by the dependency among different names’ defaults. Depen-
dency is commonly called, with an abuse of language, “correlation”. This is an abuse of
language because correlation is a complete description of dependence for jointly Gaus-
sian random variables, but more generally it is not. The complete description is either
the whole multivariate distribution or the so-called “copula function”, that is the multi-
variate distribution once the marginal distributions have been standardized to uniform
distributions.
The dependence of the tranche on “correlation” is crucial. What the market does is
assuming a Gaussian Copula connecting the defaults of the 125 names. This copula is
parametrized by a matrix with 7750 entries of pairwise correlation parameters. However,
when looking at a tranche these 7750 parameters are assumed to be all equal to each
other. So one has a unique parameter. This is such a drastic simplification that we need
to make sure it is noticed:
7750 parameters −→ 1 parameter.
Then one chooses the tranches that are liquid on the market for standardized port-
folios, for which the market price is known as these tranches are quoted. The unique
correlation parameter is then reverse-engineered to reproduce the price of the liquid
tranche under examination. This is called implied correlation, and once obtained it is
used to value related products. The problem is that whenever the tranche is changed,
this implied correlation changes as well. Therefore, if at a given time the 3-6% tranche
for a five year maturity has a given implied correlation, the 6-9% tranche for the same
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maturity will have a different one. It follows that the two tranches on the same pool are
priced with two models having different and inconsistent loss distributions, corresponding
to the two different correlation values that have been implied.
This may sound negative, but as a matter of fact the situation is even worse. We will
explain in detail that there are two possible implied correlation paradigms: compound
correlation and base correlation. The second one is the one that is prevailing in the
market. However, base correlation is inconsistent even at single tranche level, in that
it prices the 3-6% tranche by decomposing it into the 0-3% tranche and 0-6% tranche
and using two different correlations (and hence distributions) for those. Therefore base
correlation is inconsistent already at single tranche level. And this inconsistency shows
up occasionally in negative losses (i.e. in defaulted names resurrecting).
This is admittedly enough to spark a debate. Even before modeling enters the picture,
some famous market protagonists have labeled the objects of modeling, i.e. derivatives,
as responsible for a lot of troubles. Warren Buffett, in a very interesting 2003 report
wrote: “[...] Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the
trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties
that deal in them and the economic system. [...] In our view [...] derivatives are financial
weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially
lethal. [...] The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of
man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen).”3 While when hearing about products such
as Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs) or CDO squared one may sympa-
thize with Mr. Buffett, this overgeneralization might be a little excessive. Derivatives,
when used properly, can be quite useful. For example, swap contracts on several asset
classes (interest rates, foreign exchange, oil and other commodities) and related options
allow entities to trade risks and buy protection against adverse market moves. Without
derivatives, companies could not protect themselves against adverse future movements
of the prices of oil, exchange rates, interest rates etc. This is not to say that derivatives
cannot be abused. They certainly can, and we invite the interested readers to reason on
the case of CPDOs4 as an example, and to read the whole report by Mr Buffett.
When moving beyond the products and entering the modeling issues, one may still
find popular accounts resorting to quite colorful expressions such as “the formula that
killed Wall Street”. Indeed, if one looks at popular accounts such as Salmon (2009)5,
3February, 21 2003, “Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report 2002”,
www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
4See for example Torresetti and Pallavicini (2007), “Stressing Rating Criteria Allowing for Default
Clustering: the CPDO case“, and the Fitch Ratings report “First Generation CPDO: Case Study on
Performance and Ratings”, published before the crisis in April 2007, stating “[...] Fitch is of the opinion
that the past 10 years by no means marked a high investment grade stress in the range of ’AAA’ or
’AA’.”
5Recipe for disaster: the Formula that killed Wall Street. Wired Magazine, 17.03.
4
or Jones (2009)6 just to make two examples, one may end up with the impression that
the quantitative finance (“quant”) community has been incredibly naive in accepting the
Gaussian Copula and implied correlation without questioning it, possibly leading to what
Mr Buffet calls “mark to myth” in his above–mentioned report, especially when applying
the calibrated correlation to other non-quoted “bespoke tranches”. In fact both articles
have been written on the Gaussian copula, a static model that is little more than a static
multivariate distribution which is used in credit derivatives (and in particular CDOs)
valuation and risk management. Can this simple static model have fooled everyone in
believing it was an accurate representation of a quite dynamic reality, and further cause
the downfall of Wall Street banks? While Salmon (2009) correctly reports that some of
the deficiencies of the model have been known for a while, Jones (2009) in the Financial
Times wonders why no-one seemed to have noticed the model’s weaknesses. The crisis
is considered to have been heavily affected by mathematical models, with the accent on
“mathematical”.
This is in line with more general criticism of anything quantitative appearing in the
news. As an example, the news article “McCormick Bad Dollars Derive From Deficits
Model Beating Quants”,7 more focused on the currency markets, informs us that “[...]
focus on the economic reasons for currency moves is gaining more traction after years
when traders and investors relied on mathematical models of quantitative analysis.”
Then it continues with “These tools worked during times of global growth and declining
volatility earlier this decade, yet failed to signal danger before the financial crisis sparked
the biggest currency swings in more than 15 years. McCormick, using macroeconomic
and quantitative analyses, detected growing stresses in the global economy before the
meltdown.” The reader, by looking at this, may understand that on one side “mathe-
matical models of quantitative analysis” (a sentence that sounds quite redundant) fail in
times of crises, whereas “macroeconomic and quantitative analyses” helped predicting
some aspects of the crisis. One is left to wonder what is the different use of “quantita-
tive” between “mathematical models of quantitative analysis” and “macroeconomic and
quantitative analyses”. It is as though mathematics had all of a sudden become a bad
word. Of course the article aims at saying that macroeconomic analysis and fundamen-
tals are of increasing importance and should be taken more into account, although in
our opinion it does not distinguish clearly valuation from prediction, but some of the
sentences used to highlight this idea are quite symptomatic of the attitude we described
above towards modeling and mathematics.
Another article that brings mathematics and mathematicians (provided that is what
one means by “math wizards”) into the picture for the blaming is Lohr (2009), in “Wall
Street’s Math Wizards Forgot a Few Variables”, appeared in the New York Times of
6Jones, S. (2009). Of couples and copulas: the formula that felled Wall St. April 24 2009, Financial
Times.
7By Oliver Biggadike, November, 24 2009, Bloomberg.
5
September 12. Also, Turner8 (2009) has a section entitled “Misplaced reliance on so-
phisticated maths”.
This overall hostility and blaming attitude towards mathematics and mathematicians,
whether in the industry or in academia, is the reason why we feel it is important to point
out the following: the notion that even more mathematically oriented quants have not
been aware of the Gaussian Copula model limitations is simply false, as we are going
to show, and you may quote us on this. The quant and academic communities have
produced and witnessed a large body of research questioning the copula assumption.
This is well documented: there is even a book9 based on a one-day conference hosted by
Merrill Lynch in London in 2006, well before the crisis, and called “Credit Correlation:
Life after Copulas”. This conference had been organized by practitioners. The “Life after
Copulas” book contains several attempts to go beyond the Gaussian Copula and implied
correlation, most of which come from practitioners (and a few by academics). But that
book is only a tip of the iceberg. There are several publications that appeared pre-
crisis and that questioned the Gaussian Copula and implied correlation. For example,
we warned against the dangers implicit in the use of implied correlation in our report
“Implied Correlation: A paradigm to be handled with care”, that we posted in SSRN in
2006, again well before the crisis.
Still, it seems that this is little appreciated by some market participants, commenta-
tors, journalists, critics, politicians, and academics. There are still a number of people
out there who think that a formula killed Wall Street.
This paper brings a little clarity by telling a true story of pre-crisis warnings and
also of pre-crisis attempts to remedy the drawbacks of implied correlation. We do not
document the whole body of research that has addressed the limits of base correlation
and of the Gaussian Copula, but rather take a particular path inside this body, based
on our past research, that we also update to see what our models tell us in-crisis.
To put our paper in a nutshell, we can say that it starts from the payoffs of CDOs,
explaining how to write them and how they work. We then move to the introduction
of the inconsistent Gaussian Copula model and the related implied correlations, both
compound and base, moving then to the GPL model: an arbitrage-free dynamic loss
model capable of consistently calibrating all the tranches across attachments and de-
tachments for all the maturities at the same time. En passant, we also illustrate the
Implied Copula, a method that can consistently account for CDOs with different attach-
ment and detachment points but not for different maturities, and the Expected Tranche
Loss (ETL) surface, a model independent approach to CDO prices interpolation.
We will see that, already pre-crisis, both the Implied Copula and the dynamic loss
model imply modes far down the right tail of the loss distribution. This means that
there are default probability clusters corresponding to joint default of a large number of
8Turner, J.A. (2009). The Turner Review. March 2009. Financial Services Authority, UK.
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner review.pdf.
9Lipton, A. and Rennie, A. (Editors), Credit Correlation - Life After Copulas, World Scientific, 2007.
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entities (sectors) of the economy.
The discussion is abundantly supported by market examples through history. We
cannot stress enough that the dangers and critics we present to the use of the Gaussian
Copula and of implied correlation, and the modes in the tail of the loss distribution
obtained with consistent models, had all been published by us, among others, in 2006,
well before the crisis.
Despite these warnings, the Gaussian Copula model is still used in its base correlation
formulation, although under some possible extensions such as random recovery. The
reasons for this are complex. First the difficulty of all the loss models, improving the
consistency issues, in accounting for single name data and to allow for single name
sensitivities. This is due to the fact that if we model the loss of the pool directly
as an aggregate object, without taking into account single defaults, then the model
sensitivities to single name credit information are not in the picture. In other terms,
while the aggregate loss is modeled so as to calibrate satisfactorily indices and tranches,
the model does not see the single name defaults but just the loss dynamics as an aggregate
object. Therefore partial hedges with respect to single names are not possible. As these
issues are crucial in many situations, the market practice remains with base correlation.
Furthermore, even the few models achieving single name consistency have not been
developed and tested enough to become operational on a trading floor or in a large
risk management platform. Indeed, a fully operational model with realistic run times
and numerical stability across a large range of possible market inputs would be more
than a prototype with some satisfactory properties that has been run in some “off-line”
studies. Also, when one model has been coded in the libraries of a financial institution,
changing the model implies a long path involving a number of issues that have little to
do with modeling and more to do with IT problems, integration with other systems, and
the likes. Therefore, unless a new model appears to be really promising and extremely
convincing in all its aspects, there is reluctance in adopting it on the trading floor or on
risk management systems.
Overall we conclude that the modeling effort in this area of the derivatives market
is unfinished, partly for the lack of an operationally attractive single-name consistent
dynamic loss model, and partly because of the diminished investment in this research
area, but the fact that the modeling effort is unfinished does not mean that the quant
community has been unaware of model limitations, as we abundantly document, and,
although our narrative ends with an open finale, we still think it is an entertaining true
story.
Part 2: How I learned to stop worrying and love the CDOs
We cannot close this preface without going back to the large picture, and ask the more
general question: is the crisis due to poor modeling?
As we have seen, the market has been using simplistic approaches for credit deriva-
tives, but it has also been trying to move beyond those. However, we should also mention
that CDOs are divided into two categories: Cash and Synthetics. Cash CDOs involve
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hundreds or even thousands of names and have complex path-dependent payouts (“wa-
terfalls”). Even so, Cash CDOs are typically valued by resorting to single homogeneous
default-rate scenarios or very primitive assumptions, and very little research and liter-
ature is available on them. Hence these are complex products with sophisticated and
path-dependent payouts that are often valued with extremely simplistic models. Syn-
thetic CDOs are the ones we described in this preface and that will be addressed in this
paper. They have more simple and standardized payouts than the cash CDOs but are
typically valued with more sophisticated models, given the larger standardization and
the ease in finding market quotes for their prices. Synthetic CDOs on corporates are
epitomized by the quoted tranches of the standard pools DJ-iTraxx (Europe) and CDX
(USA). However, CDOs, especially Cash, are available on other asset classes, such as
loans (CLO), residential mortgage portfolios (RMBS), commercial mortgages portfolios
(CMBS), and on and on. For many of these CDOs, and especially RMBS, quite related
to the asset class that triggered the crisis, the problem is in the data rather than in the
models. Bespoke corporate pools have no data from which to infer default “correlation”
and dubious mapping methods are used. At times data for valuation in mortgages CDOs
(RMBS and CDO of RMBS) are dubious and can be distorted by fraud10.
At times it is not even clear what is in the portfolio: the authors have visioned
offering circulars of a RMBS on a huge portfolio of residential mortgages where more
than the 2% of properties in the portfolio were declared to be of unknown type. What
inputs can we give to the models if we do not even know the kind of residential property
that functions as underlying of the derivative?
All this is before modeling. Models obey a simple rule that is popularly summarized
by the acronym GIGO (Garbage In → Garbage Out). As Charles Babbage (1791-1871)
famously put it:
On two occasions I have been asked [by members of Parliament], “Pray, Mr.
Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers
come out?” I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas
that could provoke such a question.
So, in the end, is the crisis due to models inadequacy? Is the crisis due to quantitative
analysts and academics pride and unawareness of models limitations?
We show in this paper that quants have been aware of the limitations and of extreme
risks before the crisis. Lack of data or fraud-corrupted data, the fragility in the “origi-
nate to distribute” system, liquidity and reserves policies, regulators lack of uniformity,
excessive leverage and concentration in real estate investment, poor liquidity risk man-
agement techniques, accounting rules and excessive reliance on credit rating agencies are
often factors not to be underestimated. This crisis is a quite complex event that defies
witch-hunts, folklore and superstition. Methodology certainly needs to be improved but
10See for example the FBI Mortgage fraud report, 2007,
www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage fraud07.htm.
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blaming just the models for the crisis appears, in our opinion, to be the result of a very
limited point of view.
London, Milan, Madrid, Pavia and Venice, December 1, 2009.
Damiano Brigo, Andrea Pallavicini and Roberto Torresetti.
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1 Introduction:
credit modeling pre- and in-crisis
This paper aims at showing the limits of popular models or pseudo-models (mostly quot-
ing mechanisms with modeling semblance) that in the past years have been extensively
used to mark to market and risk manage multi-name credit derivatives. We present a
compendium of results we first published before the crisis, back in 2006, pointing out
the dangers in the modeling paradigms used at the time in the market, and showing
how the situation has even worsened subsequently by analyzing more recent data. We
also point out that the current paradigm had been heavily criticized before the crisis,
referring to our and other authors works addressing the main limitations of the current
market paradigm well before popular accounts such as Salmon (2009) appeared.
Problems of the current paradigm include
• Unrealistic Gaussian copula assumption and flattening of 7750 pairwise dependence
parameters into one.
• Lack of consistency of the implied correlation market models with more than one
tranche quote at the time
• Occasional impossibility of calibration even of single tranches, or possibility to
obtain negative expected tranched losses violating the arbitrage free constraints.
• Lack of an implied loss distribution consistent with market CDO tranche quotes
for a single maturity.
• Lack of a loss distribution dynamics consistent with CDO tranche quotes on several
maturities;
In this respect we will introduce examples of models published before the crisis that
partly remedy the above deficiencies. All the discussion is supported by examples based
on market data, pre- and in- crisis. In addressing these issues we adopt the following
path through the different methodologies.
Bottom-up models
A common way to introduce dependence in credit derivatives modeling is by means of
copula functions. A typically Gaussian copula is postulated on the exponential random
variables triggering defaults of the pool names according to first jumps of Poisson pro-
cesses. In general, if one tries to model dependence by specifying dependence across
single default times, one is in the so called “bottom-up” framework, and the copula
approach is typically within this framework. Such procedure cannot be extended in a
simple way to a fully dynamical model in general. We cannot do justice to the huge
copula literature in credit derivatives here. We only mention that there have been at-
tempts to go beyond the Gaussian copula introduced in the CDO world by Li (2000)
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and leading to the implied (base and compound) correlation framework, some important
limits of which have been pointed out in Torresetti et al. (2006b). Li et al (2005) also
proposed a mixture approach in connection with CDO squared. For results on sensitiv-
ities computed with the Gaussian copula models see for example Meng and Sengupta
(2008).
An alternative to copulas in the bottom up context is to insert dependence among
the default intensities of single names, see for example the paper by Chapovsky, Rennie
and Tavares (2006). Joshi and Stacey (2006) resort to modeling business time to create
default correlation in otherwise independent single names defaults, resorting to an “in-
tensity gamma” framework. Similarly but in a firm value inspired context, Baxter (2006)
introduces Levy firm value processes in a bottom up framework for CDO calibration.
Lopatin (2008) introduces a bottom up framework effective in the CDO context as well,
having single name default intensities being deterministic functions of time and of the
pool default counting process, then focusing on hedge ratios and analyzing the frame-
work from a numerical performances point of view, showing this model to be interesting
even if lacking explicit modeling of single names credit spread volatilities.
Going back to bottom-up models in the context of CDOs, Albanese et al. (2006)
introduce a bottom-up approach based on structural models ideas that can be made
consistent with several inputs both under the historical and pricing measures and that
manages to calibrate CDO tranches.
Compound correlation
Building on Torresetti et al (2006b), in the context of bottom-up models, we start with
the net present value (NPV) of synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) tranches
on pools of corporate credit references in its original layout: the compound correlation
framework.
We highlight two of the major weaknesses of the compound correlation:
• Lack of robustness of the compound correlation framework in view of the non-
invertibility of mainly the 10-year-maturity DJi-Traxx 6 − 9% and CDX 7 − 10%
tranches and more recently the non-invertibility of mainly the 10-year-maturity
DJi-Traxx 12− 22% and CDX 10− 15% tranches.
• Flattening information on 7750 pairwise correlation parameters into a single one
for each tranche.
• More importantly from a practical standpoint, we highlight the typical non smooth
behaviour of the compound correlation and the resulting difficulties in pricing
bespoke CDO tranches.
Base correlation
We then introduce the next step the industry took, see for example McGinty and
Ahluwalia (2004), namely the introduction of base correlation, as a solution to both
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problems given the fact that:
• the resulting map is much smoother, thus facilitating the pricing of bespoke tranche
spreads from liquid index tranches;
• until early 2008 the heterogeneous pool one-factor Gaussian copula base correlation
has been consistently invertible from index market tranche spreads
Nevertheless we expose what are some of the known remaining weaknesses of the
base correlation framework:
• Depending on the interpolation technique being used, tranche spreads could be not
arbitrage free. In fact for senior tranches it may well be that the expected tranche
loss plotted versus time is initially decreasing.
• The impossibility of inverting correlation for senior AAA and super senior tranches.
• Inconsistency at single tranche valuation level, as two components of the same
trade are valued with models having two different parameter values;
• Last but not least, flattening information on 7750 pairwise correlation parameters
into a single one for each equity tranche trade.
As an explanation to the first weakness we point to the fact related to the third
one, namely that this arises because the NPV of each tranche is obtained computing the
expected tranche loss and outstanding notional under two different distributions (the
distribution corresponding to the attachment base correlation and the one corresponding
to the detachment base correlation) so that base correlation is an inconsistent notion
already at single tranche level.
As an explanation to the second weakness we point to the fact that the deterministic
recovery assumption, whilst being computationally very convenient, does not allow to
capture the more recent market conditions. This has been addressed in the implied
correlation framework by Amraoui and Hitier (2008) and Krekel (2008). However, even
with this update, base correlation remains exposed to the remaining three weaknesses.
Base correlation, with updates and variants, remains to this day the main pricing
method for synthetic corporate CDOs, regardless of the body of research criticizing it
we hint at above and below.
Implied copula
We next summarize the concept of Implied Copula (introduced by Hull and White (2006)
as “Perfect Copula”) as a non-parametric model, to deduce from a set of market CDO
spreads, spanning the entire capital structure, the shape of the risk-neutral pool loss
distribution. The general use of flexible systemic factors has been later generalized and
vastly improved by Rosen and Saunders (2009), who also discuss the dynamic implica-
tions of the systemic factor framework. Factors and dynamics are also discussed in Inglis
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et al. (2008), while Eberlein, Frey and von Hammerstein (2008) generalize the original
factor model by Vasicek (1987, 1991) and also propose a dynamic Markov chain model
for CDO tranche pricing.
Our calibration results based on the implied copula, already seen in Torresetti et al
(2006c), point out that a consistent loss distribution across tranches for a single maturity
features modes in the tail of the loss distribution. These probability masses on the far
right tail imply default possibilities for large clusters (possibly sectors) of names of the
economy. These results had been published originally in 2006 on SSRN.com. We will
report such features here and we will find the same features again following a completely
different approach below.
Here we highlight the persistence of the modes (bumps) in the right tail of the implied
loss distribution
• Through time, via historical calibrations
• Through regions, comparing the results of the historical calibration to the DJi-
Traxx and the CDX
• Through maturities, comparing the results of the calibration to different maturities
The Implied Copula can calibrate consistently across the capital structure but not
across maturities, as it is a model that is inherently static. The next step thus consists in
introducing a dynamic loss model. This moves us into the so called top-down framework
(although dynamic approaches are also possible in the bottom-up context, as we have
seen in part of the above references). But before analyzing the top-down framework in
detail, we make a quick diversion for a model-independent approach to CDO tranches
pricing and interpolation.
Expected Tranche Loss (ETL) Surface
Expected tranche losses (ETL) for different detachment points and maturities can be
viewed as the basic bricks on which synthetic CDO formulas components are built with
linear operations (but under some non-linear constraints). We explain in detail how the
payoffs of credit indices and tranches are valued in terms of expected tranched losses
(ETL). This methodology, first illustrated pre-crisis in Torresetti et al. (2006a), reminds
of Walker’s (2006) earlier work and of the formal analysis of the properties of expected
tranche loss in connection with no arbitrage in Livesey and Schlo¨gl (2006).
ETL are natural quantities to imply from market data. No-arbitrage constraints on
ETLs as attachment points and maturities change are introduced briefly. As an alterna-
tive to the inconsistent notion of implied correlation illustrated earlier, we consider the
ETL surface, built directly from market quotes given minimal interpolation assumptions.
We check that the kind of interpolation does not interfere excessively with the results.
Instruments bid/asks enter our analysis, contrary to Walkers (2006) earlier work on the
ETL implied surface. By doing so we find less violations of the no-arbitrage conditions.
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We also mention some further references appeared later and dealing with evolutions of
this technique: Parcell and Wood (2007), again pre-crisis, consider carefully the impact
of different kinds of interpolation, whereas Garcia and Goossens (2007) compare ETL
between the Gaussian copula and Le´vy models.
In general the ETL implied surface can be used to value tranches with nonstandard
attachments and maturities as an alternative to implied correlation. However, deriving
hedge ratios as well as extrapolation may prove difficult. Also, ETL is not really a model
but rather a model-independent stripping algorithm, although the particular choice of
interpolation may be viewed as a modeling choice. Eventually ETL is not helpful for
pricing more advanced derivatives such as tranche options or cancelable tranches. This
is because ETL does not specify an explicit dynamics for the loss of the pool. To that
we turn now, by looking at the top-down dynamic loss models.
Top (down) framework
One could give up completely single name default modeling and focus on the pool loss
and default counting processes, thus considering a dynamical model at the aggregate
loss level, associated to the loss itself or to some suitably defined loss rates. This is the
“top-down” approach, see for example Bennani (2005, 2006), Giesecke, Goldberg and
Ding (2005), Scho¨nbucher (2005), Di Graziano and Rogers (2005), Brigo, Pallavicini and
Torresetti (2006a,b), Errais, Giesecke and Goldberg (2006), Lopatin and Misirpashaev
(2007), Ding, Giesecke and Tomecek (2009) among others.
The first joint calibration results of a dynamic loss model across indices, tranches
attachments and maturities, available in Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006a), show
that even a relatively simple loss dynamics, like a capped generalized Poisson process,
suffices to account for the loss distribution dynamical features embedded in market
quotes.
This work also confirms the implied-copula findings of Torresetti et al (2006c), show-
ing that the loss distribution tail features a structured multi-modal behaviour implying
non negligible default probabilities for large fractions of the pool of credit references,
showing the potential for high losses implied by CDO quotes before the beginning of the
crisis. Cont and Minca (2008) use a non-parametric algorithm for the calibration of top
models, constructing a risk neutral default intensity process for the portfolio underlying
the CDO, looking for the risk neutral loss process “closest” to a prior loss process using
relative entropy techniques. See also Cont and Savescu (2008).
However, in general to justify the “down” in “top-down” one needs to show that
from the aggregate loss model one can recover a posteriori consistency with single-name
default processes when they are not modeled explicitly. Errais, Giesecke and Goldberg
(2006) advocate the use of random thinning techniques for their approach, see also
Halperin and Tomecek (2008), who delve into more practical issues related to random
thinning of general loss models, and Giesecke, Goldberg and Ding (2005) who compare
the thinning based edges of the top down model with the copula-based ones. Bielecki,
Crepey and Jeanblanc (2008) build semi-static hedging examples and consider cases
14
where the portfolio loss process may not be a sufficient statistics.
Still, it is not often clear for specific models whether a fully consistent single-name
default formulation is possible given an aggregate model as the starting point. There
is a special “bottom-up” approach that can lead to a distinct and rich loss dynamics.
This approach is based on the common Poisson shock (CPS) framework, reviewed in
Lindskog et al. (2003). This approach allows for more than one defaulting name in small
time intervals, contrary to some of the above-mentioned “top-down” approaches. In the
“bottom-up” language, one sees that this approach leads to a Marshall-Olkin copula
linking the first jump (default) times of single names. In the “top-down” language, this
model looks very similar to the Generalized Poisson Loss model in Brigo et al (2006a)
when one does not cap the number of defaults. The problem of the CPS framework is
that it allows for repeated defaults, which is clearly wrong as one name could default
more than once.
In the credit derivatives literature the CPS framework has been used for example in
Elouerkhaoui (2006), see also references therein. Balakrishna (2006) introduces a semi-
analytical approach allowing again for more than one default in small time intervals
and hints at its relationship with the CPS framework, showing also some interesting
calibration results. Balakrishna (2007) then generalizes this earlier paper to include
delayed default dependence and contagion.
Generalized Poisson (Cluster) Loss model
Brigo et al (2007) address the repeated default issue in CPS by controlling the clusters
default dynamics to avoid repetitions. They calibrate the obtained model satisfactorily
to CDO quotes across attachments and maturities, but the combinatorics for a non-
homogeneous version of the model are forbidding, and the resulting GPCL approach is
hard to use successfully in practice when taking into account single names. Still, in the
context of the present paper, the GPL and GPCL models will be useful in showing how
a loss distribution dynamics consistent with CDO market quotes should evolve.
In this paper we summarize the Generalized Poisson Loss model, leaving aside the
GPCL model. As explained above, GPL is a dynamical models for the loss, able to
reprice all tranches and all maturities at the same time. We employ here a variant that
models directly the loss rather than the default counting process plus recovery. The
loss is modeled as the sum of independent Poisson processes, each associated with the
default of a different number of entities, and capped at the pool size to avoid infinite
defaults. The intuition of these driving Poisson processes is that of defaults of sectors,
although the sectors amplitudes vary in our formulation of the model pre- and in-crisis.
In the new model implementation in-crisis for this paper we fix the amplitude of the loss
triggered by each cluster of defaults a priori, without calibrating it as we were doing in
our earlier GPL work. This makes the calibration more transparent and the calibrated
intensities of the sectors defaults easier to interpret. We point out, however, that the
precise default of sectors is made rigorous only in GPCL.
We highlight how the GPL model is able to reproduce the tail multimodal feature that
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the Implied Copula proved to be indispensable to reprice accurately the market spreads of
CDO tranches on a single maturity. We also refer to the later related results of Longstaff
and Rajan (2007), that point in the same direction but adding a principal component
analysis on a panel of CDS spread changes, with some more comments on the economic
interpretation of the default clusters being sectors. An econometric investigation of
cluster defaults starting from the Poisson framework is in Duan (2009).
Remark 1.1. We draw the reader’s attention to the default history, pointing to default
clusters being concentrated in a relatively short time period (a few months) like the thrifts
in the early 90s at the height of the loan and deposit crisis, airliners after 2001, autos and
financials more recently. In particular, from the 7th September 2008 to the 8th October
2008, a time window of one month, we witnessed seven credit events occurring to major
financial entities: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual,
Landsbanki, Glitnir, Kaupthing. Fannie Mae and Freedie Mac conservatorships were
announced on the same date (September 7, 2008) and the appointment of a “receivership
committee” for the three icelandic banks (Landsbanki, Glitnir, Kauping) was announced
between the 7th and the 8th of October.
Remark 1.2. Standard and Poors issued a request for comments related to changes in
the rating criteria of corporate CDO11. Thus far agencies have been adopting a multi-
factor Gaussian Copula approach to simulate the portfolio loss in the objective measure.
S&P proposed changing the criteria so that tranches rated ’AAA’ should be able to with-
stand the default of the largest single industry in the asset pool with zero recoveries. We
believe this goes in the direction of modelling the loss in the risk neutral measure via
GPL like processes, given that this implies admitting as a stressed but plausible scenario
the possibility that a cluster defaults in the objective measure. See also Torresetti and
Pallavicini (2007) for the specific case of Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDO).
We finally comment more generally on the dynamical aggregate models and on their
difficulties to lead to single name hedge ratios when trying to avoid complex combina-
torics. The framework remains thus incomplete to this day, because obtaining jointly
tractable dynamics and consistent single name hedges, that can be realistically applied
in a trading floor, remains a problem. We provided some references for the latest re-
search in this field above. We highlight, though, that even a simple dynamical model
like our GPL or the single-maturity implied copula is enough to appreciate that the
market quotes were implying the presence of large default clusters with non-negligible
probabilities well in advance of the credit crisis, as we documented in 2006 and early
2007.
11see “Request for Comment: Update to Global Methodologies and Assumptions for Corporate Cash
Flow CDO and Synthetic CDO Ratings” , 18-Mar-09, Standard & Poors.
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Paper structure
Section 2 introduces the index and CDO tranche payouts we will be analyzing in this
paper, explaining also the definition of tranche spread and upfront quotes. Section 3
introduces the Gaussian copula model, in its different formulations concerning homo-
geneity and finiteness, and then illustrates the notions of implied correlation from CDO
tranche quotes. The two paradigms of base correlation and compound correlation are
explained in detail. Existence and uniqueness of implied correlation are discussed on a
number of market examples, highlighting the pros and cons of compound and base corre-
lations, and the limitations inherent in these concepts. The section ends with a summary
of issues with implied correlations, pointing out the danger for arbitrage when negative
expected tranche losses surface, and the lack of consistency across capital structure and
maturity. The first inconsistency is then addressed in Section 4, with the implied cop-
ula, illustrated with a number of studies throughout a long period, both pre- and in-
crisis, whereas both inconsistencies are addressed in Section 6, where our full-fledged
GPL dynamic loss model is illustrated pre-crisis. In Section 6 we explore en passant a
model-free extraction of expected loss information from CDO quotes that can be occa-
sionally helpful in interpolating or checking arbitrage constraints. All these paradigms
are then analyzed in crisis in Section 7, while the final discussion, including the reasons
why implied correlation is still used despite all its important shortcomings, are given in
Section 8. In Particular, the need for hedge ratios with respect to single names, random
recovery modeling and speed of calibration remain issues that are hard to address jointly
outside the base correlation framework.
2 Market quotes
For single names our reference products will be credit default swaps (CDS).
The most liquid multi-name credit instruments available in the market are instead
credit indices and CDO tranches (e.g. DJi-TRAXX, CDX). We discuss them in the
following.
The procedure for selecting the standardized pool of names is the same for the two
indices. Every six months a new series is rolled at the end of a polling process managed
by MarkIt where a selected list of dealers contributes the ranking of the most liquid
CDS. All credit references that are not investment grade are discarded. Each surviving
credit reference underlying the CDS is assigned to a sector. Each sector is contributing
a predetermined number of credit references to the final pool of names. The rankings
of the various dealers for the investment grade names are put together to rank the most
liquid credit references within each sector.
The index is given by a pool of names 1, 2, . . . ,M , typically M = 125, each with
notional 1/M so that the total pool has unitary notional. The index default leg consists
of protection payments corresponding to the defaulted names of the pool. Each time one
or more names default the corresponding loss increment is paid to the protection buyer,
until final maturity T = Tb arrives or until all the names in the pool have defaulted.
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In exchange for loss increase payments, a periodic premium with rate S is paid from
the protection buyer to the protection seller, until final maturity Tb. This premium
is computed on a notional that decreases each time a name in the pool defaults, and
decreases of an amount corresponding to the notional of that name (without taking out
the recovery).
We denote with L¯t the portfolio cumulated loss and with C¯t the number of defaulted
names up to time t divided by M . Since at each default part of the defaulted notional
is recovered, we have 0 ≤ dL¯t ≤ dC¯t ≤ 1. The discounted payoff of the two legs of the
index is given as follows:
DEFLEG(0) :=
∫ T
0
D(0, t)dL¯t
PREMIUMLEG(0) = S0
b∑
i=1
δiD(0, Ti)(1− C¯Ti)
where D(s, t) is the discount factor (often assumed to be deterministic) between times
s and t and δi = Ti − Ti−1 is the year fraction. In the second equation the actual
outstanding notional in each period would be an average over [Ti−1, Ti], but we replaced
it with the value of the outstanding notional at Ti for simplicity.
The market quotes the values of S0 that, for different maturities, balances the two
legs. Assuming deterministic default-free interest rates, if one has a model for the loss
and the number of defaults one may impose that the loss and number of defaults in the
model, when plugged inside the two legs, lead to the same risk neutral expectation (and
thus price)
S0 =
∫ T
0
D(0, t) dE0
[
L¯t
]∑b
i=1 δiD(0, Ti)(1− E0
[
C¯Ti
]
)
(1)
Synthetic CDO with maturity T are contracts involving a protection buyer, a pro-
tection seller and an underlying pool of names. They are obtained by “tranching” the
loss of the pool between the points A and B, with 0 ≤ A < B ≤ 1.
L¯A,Bt :=
1
B − A
[
(L¯t − A)1{A<L¯t≤B} + (B − A)1{L¯t>B}
]
An alternative expression that is useful is
L¯A,Bt :=
1
B − A
[
BL¯0,Bt − AL¯0,At
]
(2)
Once enough names have defaulted and the loss has reached A, the count starts. Each
time the loss increases the corresponding loss change re-scaled by the tranche thickness
B −A is paid to the protection buyer, until maturity arrives or until the total pool loss
exceeds B, in which case the payments stop.
The discounted default leg payoff can then be written as
DEFLEGA,B(0) :=
∫ T
0
D(0, t)dL¯A,Bt
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Again, one should not be confused by the integral, the loss L¯A,Bt changes with discrete
jumps. Analogously, also the total loss L¯t and the tranche outstanding notional change
with discrete jumps.
As usual, in exchange for the protection payments, a premium rate SA,B0 , fixed at time
T0 = 0, is paid periodically, say at times T1, T2, . . . , Tb = T . Part of the premium can
be paid at time T0 = 0 as an upfront U
A,B
0 . The rate is paid on the “survived” average
tranche notional. If we further assume payments are made on the notional remaining at
each payment date Ti, rather than on the average in [Ti−1, Ti], the premium leg can be
written as
PREMIUMLEGA,B(0) := U
A,B
0 + S
A,B
0 DV01A,B(0)
DV01A,B(0) :=
b∑
i=1
δiD(0, Ti)(1− L¯A,BTi )
When pricing CDO tranches, one is interested in the premium rate SA,B0 that sets
to zero the risk neutral price of the tranche. The tranche value is computed taking
the (risk-neutral) expectation (in t = 0) of the discounted payoff consisting on the
difference between the default and premium legs above. Assuming deterministic default-
free interest rates we obtain
SA,B0 =
∫ T
0
D(0, t)dE0
[
L¯A,Bt
]
− UA,B0∑b
i=1 δiD(0, Ti)(1− E0
[
L¯A,BTi
]
)
(3)
The above expression can be easily recast in terms of the upfront premium UA,B0 for
tranches that are quoted in terms of upfront fees.
The tranches that are quoted on the market refer to standardized pools, standardized
attachment-detachment points A − B and standardized maturities. The standardized
attachment and detachment are slightly different for the CDX.NA.IG and the DJi-Traxx
Europe Main12.
For the DJi-Traxx and CDX pools, the equity tranche (A = 0, B = 3%) is quoted by
means of the fair UA,B0 , while assuming
13 SA,B0 = 500bps. All other tranches are generally
quoted by means of the fair running spread SA,B0 , assuming no upfront fee (U
A,B
0 = 0).
Following the recent market turmoil also the 3-6% and the 3-7% have been quoting in
terms of an upfront amount and a running SA,B0 = 500bps given the exceptional riskiness
priced by the market also for mezzanine tranches.
12The attachment of the CDX tranches are slightly higher reflecting the average higher perceived
riskiness (as measured for example by the CDS spread or balancesheet ratios) of the liquid investment
grade north american names.
13The reason for the equity tranche to be quoting as upfront is to reduce the counterparty credit risk
the protection seller is facing.
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DJi-Traxx Europe Main CDX.NA.IG
0-3% 0-3%
3-6% 3-7%
6-9% 7-10%
9-12% 10-15%
12-22% 15-30%
22-100% 30-100%
Table 1: Standardized attachment and detachment for the DJi-Traxx Europe Main and
CDX.NA.IG tranches
3 Gaussian copula model
The Gaussian Copula model is a possible way to model dependence of random variables
and, in our case, of default times. As the default event of a credit reference is a ran-
dom binary variable, the correlation between default events is not an intuitive object to
handle. We need to focus our attention rather on default times. We denote by τi the
default time of name i in a pool of M names. Default times of different names need to
be connected. The copula formalism allows to do this in the most general way.
Indeed, if pi(t) = Q { τi ≤ t } is the default probability of name i by time t, we know
that the random variable pi(τi) = Ui is a uniform random variable. Copulas are multi-
variate distributions on uniform random variables. If we call C(u1, . . . , un) a multivariate
uniform distribution, and U1, . . . , UM is a multivariate uniform with distribution C, then
a possible multivariate distribution of the default times with marginals pi is
τ1 := p
−1
1 (U1), . . . , τM := p
−1
M (UM),
where for simplicity we are assuming the ps to be strictly invertible. Clearly, since the
U1, . . . , UM variables are connected through a multivariate distribution C, we have a
dependence structure on the default times.
The Gaussian copula enters the picture when we assume that
[U1, . . . , UM ] = [Φ(X1), · · · ,Φ(XM)]
where the Xi are standard Gaussian random variables and [X1, . . . , XM ] is a given mul-
tivariate Gaussian random variable with a given correlation matrix. Φ is the cumulative
distribution function of the one-dimensional standard Gaussian. In the Gaussian Copula
model the default times are therefore linked via normally distributed latent factors X.
A particular structure is assumed for the default probabilities pi. The default prob-
abilities of single names are supposed to be related to hazard rates λ. In other terms
pi(t) = 1− exp(−
∫ t
0
λi(s)ds). We define Λi(t) :=
∫ t
0
λi(s)ds.
We also anticipate that the correlation matrix characterizing the Gaussian copula
is often taken with all off-diagonal entries equal to each other according to a common
value ρ in corporate synthetic CDO valuation applications. This is always the case in
particular when defining implied correlations.
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SA,B0 (spread) or U
A,B
0 (upfront) would be provided by the market and a correlation
number ρ characterizing a Gaussian copula with a correlation matrix where all entries
are equal to ρ (in this case we will say the correlation matrix to be “flat to ρ”) would be
implied from the market quote. Indeed, Formula (3) defined the market quotes in terms
of expectations of the tranced loss L¯A,B; in turn, the loss to be tranched at a given time
is defined in terms of single default times as
L¯t =
M∑
i=1
1
M
(1−Ri)1{τi≤t} =
M∑
i=1
1
M
(1−Ri)1{Φ(Xi)≤pi(t)} (4)
where the Xi are multivariate Gaussians with correlation matrix flat to ρ and Ri are the
recovery rates associated to each name.
The correlation parameter ρ is therefore affecting the tranche price since it is a key
statistical parameter contributing to the tranched loss distribution whose expectation
will be used in matching the market quote. Implied correlation aims at finding the value
of ρ consistent with a given tranche quote when every other model parameter (the pis,
the Ris) has been fixed.
We next illustrate the two main types of implied correlation one may obtain from
market CDO tranche spreads:
1. Compound correlation is more consistent at single tranche level but for some mar-
ket CDO tranche spreads cannot be implied or more than one correlation can be
implied.
2. Base correlation is less consistent but more flexible and can be implied for a much
wider set of CDO tranche market spreads. Furthermore, base correlation is more
easily interpolated and leads to the possibility to price non-standard detachments.
Even so, Base correlation may lead to negative expected tranche losses, thus vi-
olating basic no-arbitrage conditions. We illustrate these features with numerical
examples.
We will first introduce the general One-Factor Gaussian Copula model. Then we will
introduce the Finite Pool (where M is finite) Homogeneous (p1 = p2 = . . . = pM and
R1 = R2 = . . . = RM) One-Factor Gaussian Copula model. We will show how the loss
probabilities formulas can be computed in this case.
Remark 3.1. In this work we stay with the homogeneous version, since this is enough
to highlight some of the key flaws of implied correlation, leaving to the full book of Brigo,
Pallavicini and Torresetti (2010) the detailed derivation of the formulas for the hetero-
geneous and large pool versions. It is to be said that in practice, due to the necessity of
computing hedge rations with respect to single names, the heterogeneous version is used,
even if spread dispersion across names, leading possibly to very different pis, complicates
matters.
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3.1 One-factor Gaussian copula model
A One-factor copula structure is a special case of the Gaussian copula above where
Xi =
√
ρi S +
√
1− ρi Yi,
with Yi, S standard independent Gaussian variables. S is a systemic factor affecting
default times of all names. Yi is a idiosyncratic factor affecting just the i-th name.
This parameterization would lead to a correlation between Gaussian factors Xi and
Xj given by
√
ρiρj. However, consistently with the flat correlation assumption and the
homogeneity assumption all pairwise correlation parameters collapse to a single common
value, i.e. ρi = ρ for all i.
Assuming deterministic and possibly distinct recovery rate Ri upon default we are
able to simulate the pool loss at any time t starting from the simulation of the Gaussian
variables Xis starting from equation (4). Thus we are able to simulate the NPV of the
premium and default leg of any tranche.
The heterogeneous Gaussian Copula model assumes possibly different recovery rates
Ri and probabilities of default pi(t). The large pool assumption basically assumes ho-
mogeneity of both the recovery rates and probabilities of default and also assumes an
infinite number of credit references M leading to a substantial increase in the numerical
efficienty of the pricing formulas.
In the following, as already mentioned, we stay with the homogeneous version thus
assuming identical Ri and pi(t) for all M credit references in the pool.
Calculating the NPV of a derivative instrument via simulations can be necessary but
may lead to intensive numerical effort. Introducing the assumption of homogeneity it
turns out that the Gaussian Copula model yields a semi-analytical formula to calculate
the distribution of the pool loss.
Assume we know the realization of the systemic factor S. In this case, conditional
on S, the default events of the pool of credit references are independent. The default
by time T conditional on the realization of the systemic factor S of each single credit
reference in the pool is a Bernoulli random variable with the same event probability of
default
Q { τi < T |S } = Φ
(
Φ−1(1− exp(−Λ(T )))−√ρS√
1− ρ
)
.
The number of defaulted entities in the pool by time T conditional on the realization
of the systemic factor S is the sum of M Bernoulli variables and thus is binomially
distributed.
Q
{
C¯T =
n
M
∣∣∣S } = M !
n!(M − n)! Q { τi < T |S }
n (1−Q { τi < T |S })M−n (5)
where we point out that the Q { τi < T |S }s are the same for all is, since we are dealing
with an homogeneous pool assumption.
We can now integrate the expression in (5) to get the unconditional probability of n
defaults occurring to the standardized pool of M credit references before time T , leading
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to
Q
{
L¯T = (1−R) n
M
}
=
∫ +∞
−∞
Q
{
C¯T =
n
M
∣∣∣S }ϕ(S) dS (6)
By computing the integral in (6) for n = 1, ...,M we obtain the unconditional distribution
of the pool loss rate that we need in order to compute the theoretical tranche spread
SA,B0 (or upfront U
A,B
0 ) in equation (3).
The integral in equation (6) does not allow for a closed form solution whereas all other
quantities can be analytically calculated. Hence the name semi-analytical (analytical up
to the calculation of the integral) for the finite-pool homogeneous one-factor Gaussian
copula model formula for theoretical tranche spread in (3).
3.2 Compound correlation
Compound correlation is a first paradigm for implying credit default dependence from liq-
uid market data. This approach consists in linking defaults across single names through
a Gaussian copula where all the correlation parameters are collapsed to one.
Given this correlation parameter and given the desired declination of the One-Factor
Gaussian Copula we can compute the loss distribution on a given set of dates. Thus we
can compute the expectations contained in (3), and with them the fair tranche spread.
A key step that will allow us to distinguish compound from base correlation is the
decomposition of the tranche loss according to Equation (2). Since the default leg and
premium leg (in particular the DV01) defining (3) are linear in the tranced loss L¯A,Bt , by
Equation (2) this results to be linear in base tranched losses L¯0,Bt and L¯
0,A
t .
Now one key step is that when we evaluate the expected L¯A,Bt through (2), we can
use two different copula correlations for the two pieces L¯0,At (correlation ρA) and L¯
0,B
t
(correlation ρB). As a consequence, the final formula reads
E0[L¯A,Bt ](ρA, ρB) :=
1
B − A
[
BE0[L¯0,Bt ](ρB)− AE0[L¯0,At (ρA)]
]
(7)
A similar decomposition holds for the DV01, that is a linear combination of such objects.
Consider the DJi-Traxx tranches for example, to clarify the procedure. For a given
maturity in 3y, 5y, 7y, 10y, consider the market quotes
U0,3% Mkt + 500bps running,
S3,6% Mkt, S6,9% Mkt, S9,12% Mkt, S12,22% Mkt
To obtain the implied correlation one proceeds as follows.
First solve in ρ3% for the equity tranche
DEFLEG0,3%(0, ρ3, ρ3) = 500bpsDV010,3(0, ρ3, ρ3) + U
0,3% Mkt
Then in moving on one has two choices: retain ρ3 from the earlier tranche calibration
and solve
DEFLEG3,6(0, ρ3, ρ6) = S
3,6% Mkt DV013,6(0, ρ3, ρ6)
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in ρ6 (base correlation) or solve
DEFLEG3,6(0, ρ¯3,6, ρ¯3,6) = S
3,6% Mkt DV013,6(0, ρ¯3,6, ρ¯3,6)
in a new ρ¯3,6 (compound correlation). The next step will be again similar, and we iterate,
until we reach the end of the capital structure.
Tranche Running Upfront
0-3% 500 bps 49%
3-6% 360 bps 0%
6-9% 82 bps 0%
9-12% 46 bps 0%
12-22% 31 bps 0%
Table 2: DJi-Traxx Europe S5 10 year tranches quotes on August 3, 2005.
Figure 1: Implied correlation smile calibrated to the DJi-Traxx S5 10 year tranche
spreads on August 3, 2005.
Compound correlation is more consistent at the level of single tranche, since we value
the whole payoff of the tranche premium and default legs with one single copula (model)
with parameter ρ¯3,6.
Base correlation is inconsistent at the level of single tranche: we value different parts
of the same payoff with different models, i.e. part of the payoff (involving L0,3) is valued
with a copula in ρ3, while a different part (involving L0,6) of the same payoff is valued
with a copula in ρ6.
We will focus on implications for base correlation later on, and deal now with com-
pound correlation. The market data we take as inputs are detailed in Table 2. In Figure 1
we present the compound correlation smile we imply from this set of market data. We
notice that there is no bar corresponding to the 6-9% tranche: from the market spread
of the tranche we cannot imply a compound correlation. We see in the following how
this problem is not atypical.
We have just seen that on a particular date we cannot imply a compound correlation
from the market spread of the 6-9% tranche. To see why this is the case we investigate
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further this date plotting in Figure 2 the fair market spread as a function of the compound
correlation: the equity tranche is quoted upfront (0.49 means 49%) and all other tranches
are quoted in number of running basis points (360 means 3.60% per annum). The red
flat line is the level of the market spread.
Figure 2: DJi-Traxx S5 10 year Compound Correlation Invertibility. Tranche Market
spread (red line) versus theorethical tranche spread obtained varying the compound
correlation between 0 and 1 (dotted black line).
Figure 3: Compound correlation invertibility indicator (1=invertible, 0=not invertible)
for the DJi-Traxx and CDX tranches. Source Torresetti et al. (2006a).
Further, we notice that:
1. for certain tranches, from the unique market spread we can imply more than one
compound correlation, although this does not happen in our example of Figure 2
where the flat red line crosses the dotted black line at most in one point;
2. given a market spread we are not always guaranteed we can imply a compound
correlation, as we see for example in the 6-9% tranche of Figure 2 (there is no
intersection between the flat red line and the dotted black line).
We have seen that on 3rd-aug-2005 we cannot imply a compound correlation for the
6-9% tranche. In Figure 3, taken from Torresetti et al. (2006b), we see how this problem
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is not limited to a sporadic set of dates but is rather affecting clusters of dates. From
March 2005 to November 2006, the sample on which the analysis in Torresetti et al.
(2006b) is based, the non invertibility of the compound correlation concerned for DJi-
Traxx the 10 year 6-9% tranche, and for CDX the 10 year 7-10% tranche and, marginally,
the 10 year 10-15%.
Figure 4: Base Correlation calibrated to the DJi-Traxx S5 10 years tranche spreads
on August, 3 2005 (left chart) and Expected Equity tranche loss (detachment set to
the standardized tranches detachment) corresponding to the calibrated base correlation
(right chart).
Figure 5: Expected tranche loss as a function of time derived from the base correlations
calibrated to the DJi-Traxx S5 10 years tranche spreads on August, 3 2005.
3.3 Base correlation
Here we will illustrate base correlation and we will see how compound correlation prob-
lems are overcome but at the expense of introducing a deeper inconsistency.
In Figure 4 we plot the Base Correlation calibrated to the market data in Table 2
and the Expected Equity Tranche Loss for the various detachment points as a function
26
of time.
E0
[
L¯0,Bt
]
, B = 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22%.
From these expectations, using equations (2), we can compute the Expected Tranche
Loss E0[L¯A,Bt ], plotted in Figure 5 as a function of time.
From Figure 4 we note that the base correlation is a much smoother function of
detachments than compound correlation. Also, to price a non-standard tranche, say
a 4-15% tranche, we can interpolate the non-standard attachment 4% and detachment
15% whereas with the compound correlation we do not know exactly what to interpolate
(since with compound correlation there is a unique correlation associated to each tranche,
i.e. correlation is associated with two points rather than a single one).
As we can see from our examples, also the base correlation approach is not immune
from inconsistencies. In fact in Figure 7 we note that already in 2005, taking the 6-9%
tranche as an example, the expected tranche loss becomes initially slightly negative.
This inconsistency arises from the different base correlations we use in Equation (2) to
compute the two expected tranche loss terms in A and B.
3.4 Summary on implied correlation
Is base correlation a solution to the problems of compound correlation ?
The answer is in the affirmative and this can be clearly seen for example in Figure 6
where we plot the fair tranche spread as a function of the base correlation on the de-
tachment point for each tranche, given the base correlation on the attachment point set
equal to the calibrated base in the left chart of Figure 4.
This gives us an idea of the range of the tranche spread we can calibrate using base
correlation. These plots of Figure 6 can be compared with the plots in Figure 2, showing
the fair tranche spread as a function of compound correlation. In Figure 6 the thick
black line is flat at the level of the market spread for the tranche. The two thin red
lines are the minimum and maximum spread we are able to obtain by varying compound
correlation.
We note that for each tranche the fair spread is a monotonic function of the base
correlation on the detachment point and also that the range of market spreads that can
be attained by varying base correlation is much wider than the corresponding one for
compound correlation. Consider for example the 6-9% tranche in Figure 2. The tranche
spread that can be inverted in a compound correlation setting lies between 93 and 268
bps, whereas from Figure 6 the tranche spread that can be inverted in a base correlation
setting lies in the wider range between 0 and 732 bps.
In Figure 6 we did not plot the market spread for all base correlations between 0 and
1 because beyond a certain point the fair tranche spread becomes negative. Recall once
again that in Equation (2) we use two different correlation parameters for different parts
of the same payoff: when these two correlations are very different from each other (the
detachment correlation is much higher than the attachment one) the inconsistency of a
negative expected tranche loss becomes more evident.
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Figure 6: Theoretical 10 year DJi-Traxx S9 6-9% tranche spread as a function of the
detachment base correlation keeping fixed the attachment base correlation (dotted black
line), market tranche spread (flat black line) and minimum and maximum tranche spread
invertible from the compound correlation (flat red lines).
Consider for example the 6-9% tranche. In Figure 7 we plot in the abscissas the year
fraction of the tranche payment dates and in the ordinates the Expected Tranche (6-9%)
Loss. For both graphs in Figure 7 the tranche attachment correlation is the calibrated
base on the 6% detachment. The tranche detachment (9%) correlation is set to the
calibrated base on the left hand graph (38.07%) and to an arbitrarily high level (48%)
on the right hand graph.
We can see a markedly negative profile for the expected tranched loss, which clearly
violates no arbitrage constraints. Indeed, the loss must be non-negative and non-
decreasing in each paths through time, and tranching does not alter that. More simply,
the tranched loss at a given point in time is a non-negative random variable, and its
expected value needs to be non-negative itself. This does not happen in our example,
in that the basic non-negativity constraint is violated. This is a strong drawback of the
base correlation paradigm at a very basic level.
We have presented notions of implied correlation centered on the Gaussian copula.
Alternative copula specifications are possible. Indeed, Hull and White (2004) show that
on a particular date the “double-t copula” can consistently reproduce tranche spreads
without skew in the correlation parameter. See the full book of Brigo, Pallavicini and
Torresetti (2010) for more details on the double-t copula. This is unlikely to represent a
solution to the lack of consistency in calibration, given both the low number of parameters
in the model and a number of numerical issues with the procedure.
There are, overall, two major problems with the use of implied correlation as a
parameter in a Gaussian copula model as we described it above, even if one is willing
to accept the flattening of 7750 parameters into one: first, the model parameter changes
every time we change tranche, implying very different and inconsistent loss distributions
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Figure 7: Expected tranche loss of the DJi-Traxx S5 10 year tranche for two different
levels of the detachment base correlation: 38% (left chart) and 48% (right chart).
on the same pool. Second, there is a total lack of dynamics in the notion of copula. We
address the first problem now, showing that the financial literature has been doing that
well before the current crisis started in 2007. We will address the second problem in
later sections.
4 Consistency across capital structure:
implied copula
In the implied copula approach, a factor copula structure is assumed, similarly to the
One-Factor Gaussian Copula approach seen earlier. However, this time we do not model
the copula explicitly, but we model default probabilities conditional on the systemic
factor S of the copula: the copula will then be “hidden” inside these conditional prob-
abilities, that will be calibrated to the market. Hence the name “implied” copula. In
illustrating the implied copula we will also assume a large pool homogeneous model, in
that the default probabilities of single names will be taken all equal to each other and
the pool of credit references is assumed to be comprised of an infinite number of credit
references.
Let us consider, for simplicity, survival probabilities that are associated to a constant-
in-time hazard rate. We know that if we have a constant-in-time (possibly random)
hazard rate λ for name i then the survival probability is
Q(τi > t) = E[exp(−λt)]
The implied copula approach postulates the following “scenario” distribution for the
hazard rate λ conditional on the systemic factor S:
λ|S ∼

Conditional hazard rate Systemic scenario Scenario probability
λ1 S = s1 p1
λ2 S = s2 p2
...
...
...
λh S = sh ph
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This way the default probability for each single name i = 1, ...,M is, conditional on
the systemic factor S,
Q(τi < t|S = sj) = 1− exp(−λjt).
Compare with the Gaussian factor copula case:
Q(τi < T |S = sj) = Φ
(
Φ−1(1− exp(−Λ(T )))−√ρsj√
1− ρ
)
Unconditionally, the implied copula yields the default probabilities
Q(τi < t) =
h∑
j=1
pjQ(τi < t|S = sj) =
h∑
j=1
pj (1− exp(−λjt))
Conditional on S, all default times are independent, have the same hazard rate and
their hazard rates are given by the above scenarios.
By resorting to the infinite pool approximation, fully illustrated in the full book
by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2010), for the Gaussian factor copula in the LHP
version, we have that the conditional default indicators 1{τi<T |S=sj} are i.i.d. for all i, so
that their sample average as their number tends to infinity tends to the single common
true mean:
C¯MT (sj) :=
1
M
M∑
i=1
1{τi<T |S=sj} → E1{τi<T |S=sj} = Q{τi < T |S = sj} = 1− e−λjT
when M tends to ∞.
Again, this way we avoid taking expectations, except the final one with respect to
S, since conditional on S = sj all randomness has been ruled out by the law of large
numbers and both the default rate and the loss are completely determined.
We will assume, in line with the market convention, that the protection payment will
be calculated on the average outstanding notional between any two protection premium
payment dates. Conditional on the systemic factor realization S = sj the premium leg
tranche value will be:
PREMIUMLEGjA,B := U
A,B
0 + S
A,B
0 DV01
j
A,B
DV01jA,B :=
b∑
i=1
δiD(0, Ti)(1− L(0.5(Ti + Ti−1))jA,B)
L(t)jA,B :=
min(B − A,max(((1−Rj)(1− exp(−λjt))− A, 0))
B − A
where UA,B0 and S
A,B
0 are the market mid upfront and running spread for the tranche
A,B with maturity Tb.
We will discretize the loss increments, entering the calculation of the discounted de-
fault leg payoff, on the same set of dates of the discounted premium leg payoff calculation:
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the protection premium payment dates. We will also assume that on average the loss
increment arrives at the middle of each time interval [Ti−1, Ti].
DEFLEGjA,B := (1−Rj)
b∑
i=1
D (0, 0.5(Ti + Ti−1)) (L(Ti)
j
A,B − L(Ti−1)jA,B)
where Rj is a deterministic function of the probability of default conditional on the
realization of the systemic factor S, Rj = R(1− exp(−λjTb)) : we will expand more on
this issue in the next section.
In case of the index the above definitions are still valid except for the DV01 which
becomes:
DV01j0,1 :=
b∑
i=1
δiD(0, Ti)(1− L(0.5(Ti + Ti−1))j0,1/(1−Rj))
We will call PREMIUMLEGA,B and DEFLEGA,B the column vector that stacks respectively
all discounted premium leg and default leg values conditional on the systemic factor s
states:
PREMIUMLEGA,B = (PREMIUMLEG
1
A,B, . . . ,PREMIUMLEG
h
A,B)
T .
DEFLEGA,B = (DEFLEG
1
A,B, . . . ,DEFLEG
h
A,B)
T .
Then, we integrate against S, simply summing over all possible hazard rate scenarios
multiplying by the scenario probability, to obtain the tranche unconditional price. In
matrix notation the receiver tranche value can be rewritten as
NPVA,B := P
T (PREMIUMLEGA,B −DEFLEGA,B)
where P := (p1, . . . , ph)
T is the column vector with the systemic factor probability dis-
tribution.
4.1 Recovery rate
In this respect, we mention a relationship between default probabilities and recovery
rates that may be necessary to fit the market correlation skew in periods of turmoil (e.g
July 2005).
Following results of an empirical study by Hamilton et al (2005), Hull and White
suggest to change recovery in each scenario by linking it to the conditional probability
of default in that scenario:
Rj = 0.52− 6.9(1− exp(−λj5y)).
This functional form will assign a recovery 0% to all default rate above 8%. Al-
ternatively one could fit a logarithmic relationship between recovery rates and default
rates:
Rj = a log(1− exp(−λj5y)).
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Figure 8: Issuer Weighted All Rated Bond Default Rate versus Issuer Weighted Recov
Rate Senior Unsecured (left chart), data from 1982 to 2004 (Source: Moody’s) and differ-
ent functional forms between default rates and recovery rates (right chart): logarithmic
(grey line) and floored linear (dotted line).
Remark 4.1. (Random recovery as a function of the systemic factor). The
above formula makes the recovery a function of the intensity conditional on the systemic
factor. This way recovery becomes a function of the systemic factor. An approach that
makes recovery a function of the systemic factor in the inconsistent base correlation
framework is in Amraoui and Hitier (2008).
The dots in the left panel of Figure 8 are the data points we have used to fit the pa-
rameter a: Issuer Weighted All Rated Bond Default Rate and Issuer Weighted Recovery
Rate Senior Unsecured from 1982 to 2004 taken from Moody’s.
From 1982 to 2004 the Issuer Weighted All Rated Bond Default Rate has been always
below 3.82%. Therefore in the left panel of Figure 8 we cannot fully appreciate the
different implication of the two functional forms when applied to the implied copula as
we can do instead in the chart in the right panel.
4.2 Calibration of implied copula
When calibrating all the 5 year DJ-iTraxx tranches we end up minimizing a constrained
sum of squares. If we call NPV the matrix with all tranches (columns) discounted payoff
for all possible states (rows)
NPV =
 NPV10%,3% . . . NPV122%,100%. . .
NPVh0%,3% . . . NPV
h
22%,100%

then, calibration becomes simply
argmin
P=(p1,...,ph)T
P T NPV NPVT P (8)
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subject to:
h∑
i=1
pi = 1 , pi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , h
Note that for the base correlation calibration the market tranches had to have consec-
utive adjacent attachment and detachment points spanning the whole capital structure;
if that was not the case some base correlation interpolation assumption had to be in-
troduced. With the Implied Copula this is not necessary in that the tranches to be
calibrated need not span the whole capital structure or be adjacent.
In the implied copula framework, Hull and White (2006) calibrate the scenario prob-
abilities p while pre-assigning the hazard rate scenarios λj exogenously. The number
of hazard rate scenarios λj can be seen empirically to be quite large, up to h = 30,
in order to be able to fit market data with a good precision. In this case the above
optimization has too many degrees of freedom which might result in a very good fit but
quite an irregular scenario probability distribution. In order to cope with this problem
Hull and White (2006) propose to add to the target function a quantity that penalizes
changes in convexity in the patterns of the scenario probabilities plotted against the
default probabilities associated to each scenario.
Torresetti et al. (2006c) propose a different approach with respect to Hull and White
(2006) where there is no need to select a regularization coefficient. The main differences
between the two approaches are summarized as follows.
• Assign 125 possible states to the system factor S = sj. The hazard rates associated
to each state are this time such that the pool default rate at maturity is equal to
(j − 1)/125, where j = 1, . . . , 125.
• In our version perform a two stage optimization that will assure that all tranches
are priced within the bid-ask spread without the need to choose a regularization
coefficient.
The numerical solution of the fist stage optimization, i.e. the solution to the prob-
lem set out in (8), can be expressed as a deviation of each tranche theoretical spread
from the market mid quote. If the standardized mispricing is between −1 and +1 then
the vector of systemic states probabilities P results in a calibration of the theoretical
tranche spread NPVA,B/DV01A,B that lies within the bid ask. The solution to the first
stage optimization gives a numerical starting point to the second stage optimization
problem, where the second differential of the state probabilities is minimized while the
standardized mispricing is kept within the [−1, 1] interval.
We consider the market quotes in Table 3 for the CDX.NA.IG 5 year tranches on
June, 6 2006, while in Figure 9 we plot the optimal distribution resulting from the two
stage optimization as outlined in Torresetti et al. (2006c) .
4.3 Summary of considerations around implied copula
The implied copula as we presented it above can solve the problem of consistency with
tranche quotes for a single maturity: there is a unique implied loss distribution that is
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Mid Bid Ask
0-3% 32.40% 31.50% 33.60%
3-7% 106.5 bps 100 bps 113 bps
7-10% 23.5 bps 22 bps 25 bps
10-15% 10 bps 9.3 bps 10.7 bps
15-30% 5.5 bps 5.1 bps 5.9 bps
Table 3: CDX.NA.IG 5 year tranches quotes on the June, 6 2006
Figure 9: Optimal pool default counting C5y distribution resulting from the two stage
optimization: distribution tail magnified in the chart on the right panel.
consistent with all the available tranche quotes for a single maturity. Suppose one is
momentarily willing to leave aside the problem of single names modeling and hedges,
which is neglected by the homogeneous pool assumptions. When CDO tranche quotes for
more than one maturity are available, we cannot account consistently for them with an
implied copula model. We need a arbitrage-free dynamic loss model, implying future loss
distributions for the loss at different times that are consistent with the tranche quotes
at each maturity.
An explicit model implying a dynamics for dependence across defaults, absent in the
copula case, is the above mentioned GPL model given in Brigo Pallavicini and Torresetti
(2006a,b), and to that we turn in Section 6 below, leaving aside the single-name consistent
but combinatorially complex GPCL model in Brigo et al (2007). Finally, we note that
the loss distribution of the pool under the risk neutral measure, which is being discussed
in this paper, is different from the actual loss distribution in the objective measure, as
pointed out for example in Torresetti, Brigo and Pallavicini (2006c), who find the well-
known presence of a risk premium. See also the discussion in Torresetti and Pallavicini
(2007) concerning CPDOs, where the difference in the modes of the tail loss distribution
is also visible.
Before turning to the fully dynamic loss model in Section 6, we explore en passant a
model-free extraction of expected loss information from CDO quotes that can be occa-
sionally helpful in interpolating or checking arbitrage constraints.
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5 Consistency across capital structure and maturi-
ties: the Expected Tranche Loss surface
In this section we approach the issue of consistently representing the information embed-
ded in tranches across attachments and maturities in a model-free way. Let us consider
again Equation (3).
SA,B0 =
∫ T
0
D(0, t) d E0
[
L¯A,Bt
]
− UA,B0∑b
i=1 δiD(0, Ti)(1− E0
[
L¯A,BTi
]
)
The numerator and denominator of the above formula depend linearly on the expected
tranche loss E0[L¯A,BTi ] (ETL)
14 at different times. If a term structure of tranche upfronts
and spreads SA,B0,T for different maturities T is given, then it is possible to strip back the
expectations E0[L¯A,BTi ] in a model independent way. We will address this issue in this
section.
We first notice the nested structure of the expected tranche losses in time. Indeed,
the NPV calculations of two tranches with the same attachment and detachment points
(A,B) but different maturities T1 and T2, depend both on the expected tranche loss
E0[L¯A,BTi ] for each Ti ≤ min{T1, T2}. For example in the NPV calculations of a 5 year
maturity 0%-3% tranche and a 10 year maturity 0%-3% tranche the quantity E0[L¯A,BTi ]
should be the same for the calculation of the 5 and 10 year tranches for all Ti < 5y.
In the copula framework unfortunately we are not guaranteed this to be the case,
regardless of the particular copula model considered, Gaussian versus Double-t, or Ho-
mogeneous versus Heterogeneous. This has to do with the copula being a static object.
As an illustration, in Figure 10 we plot the expected 0%-3% tranche loss resulting from
the base correlation, One-Factor Homogeneous Finite Pool Gaussian Copula, calibrated
to the 3, 5 and 10 year 0%-3% tranches on January, 30th 2009.
We note that the expected 0%-3% tranche loss resulting from the calibration to the
3, 5 and 10 year 0%-3% tranches do not overlap. Thus when valuing the same expected
tranche loss E0[L¯0%,3%Ti ] for Ti < 3y we are using three different numbers depending on
the tranche maturity even though the pool of underlying credit references is the same.
In the following we will see the details of a non-parametric model-free estimation of
the basic quantities entering linearly the tranche NPV calculation, namely the expected
tranche losses E0[L¯A,BTi ], which is consistent through maturities and attachments.
5.1 Index and tranche NPV as a function of ETL
Let us assume we are given the market spreads of a set of tranches spanning the entire
capital structure. More in particular, let us assume that we have the market spreads of
14Let us stress again that the actual outstanding notional in each period would be a daily average over
[Ti−1, Ti], but for simplicity we replace it with 1− L¯A,BTi , the value of the tranche outstanding notional
at Ti.
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Figure 10: Expected 0%-3% tranche loss resulting from the base correlation, One-Factor
Homogeneous Finite Pool Gaussian Copula, calibration to the 3, 5 and 10 year 0%-3%
CDX tranches on April, 26th 2006.
a set of k tranches with attachments Aj and detachments Bj with j = 1, . . . , k where
A1 = 0, Bk = 1 and Ai+1 = Bi for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Let us consider the standardized DJ-iTraxx tranches with detachments (3%, 6%, 9%,
12%, 22%): all except the super-senior 22-100%15. Our goal is to reprice the 5y tranches
and the index: a total of 6 market quotes. To achieve this goal, given a deterministic
recovery, we will be looking for the 6 unknown 5 year ETLs that set the NPV of the
instruments as close as possible to zero when the quoted spreads and upfront payments
are put into the premium leg.
To compute the NPV of the tranches and index we also need the ETL on all payment
dates with maturity Ti shorter than 5 year: these will be obtained interpolating for each
tranche between the initial time 0, where by definition the ETL will be zero16, and the
six 5 year unknown ETL that are being sought: 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22% and 100%.
Therefore, once we set a possible value for the unknown 5 year ETLs in the iteration
implementing the optimization, through interpolation we also set a value for all the ETL
path up to 5 years that is consistent with the selected 5 years value being iterated.
Once the 5 year nodal ETLs matching the 5 years data are found, to price the 10
years tranches and index we will need also the ETL between 5 and 10 years. As before,
15At the time when Walker (2006) and Torresetti et al. (2006a) ran their analysis the super-senior
tranche was just beginning to have some liquidity so that it was not considered in their historical
calibration analysis of the expected equity tranche loss surface. In fact before the end of 2005 the
liquidity of the super-senior tranche was quite limited.
16In case the pool of underlying credit references already suffered losses, then a new version of the
index is rolled out. The existing positions in both the index and the tranches are usually promptly
rolled in the new version. Tranches of the newly rolled version see the standardized attachment and
detachment adjusted to reflect the loss in subordination and the reduction in the pool outstanding
balance.
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for each tranche this will be obtained by interpolation between the expected tranche loss
at 5 years and the six unknown ETLs at 10 year to be found.
We call f(t, h, k) the ETL at time t of the tranche with attachment h and detachment
k. To simplify the notation we will often identify the seniority of the tranche in the capital
structure of the CDO only through the detachment point k, writing f(t, h, k) = f(t, k)
when h is clear from the context given the adjacent attachment and detachment points.
f(t, A,B) := E0
[
L¯A,Bt
]
.
By assuming interest rates and default times to be independent and discretizing the
integrals entering the NPV of the premium and default leg in Equation (3) on the tranche
payment dates we obtain
SA,BTb =
∑b
i=1 D(0, Ti)(f(Ti, A,B)− f(Ti−1, A,B))∑b
i=1 δiD(0, Ti)(1− f(Ti, A,B))
(9)
Then, since the tranches are adjacent, the expected portfolio loss is the summation of
the ETL multiplied by the tranche depth (detachment minus attachment), namely:
f(t, 0, 100%) =
k∑
i=1
E[L¯Ai,Bit ] (Bi − Ai) = E[L¯t]
Once given the expected portfolio loss E[L¯t] and the recovery rate R, we can compute
the expected portfolio default rate as E[L¯t]/(1−R) = f(t, 0, 100%)/(1−R). Hence, the
index spread becomes:
STb =
∑b
i=1 D(0, Ti)(f(Ti, 0, 100%)− f(Ti−1, 0, 100%))∑b
i=1 δiD(0, Ti)(1− f(Ti, 0, 100%)/(1−R))
(10)
We will seek to calibrate tranches (the entire capital structure except the super-senior
tranche) and indices for the 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturities in terms of all the unknown
f(t, A,B) terms. The set of 4 · 10 · 6 = 240 fs (one for each maturity, quarterly payment
date and for each tranche) created by interpolating the 4 · 6 = 24 basic nodal f(t, k)s
(one for each maturity and for each detachment) will be used to set the NPV of the
24 = 4 · (5 + 1) instruments (5 tranches and 1 index for each maturity) as close to zero
as possible whilst maintaining the following constraints
argmin
{f(3y,3%),...,f(10y,100%)}
∑
T
∑
(A,B)
MisprStdz2T,A,B (11)
subject to: 
0 ≤ f(t, k) ≤ 1
f(ti, k) ≥ f(ti−1, k)
f(t, kj−1) ≥ f(t, kj)
(12)
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where
MisprStdzT,A,B =
SA,BTb − SA,B,midTb
(SA,B,askTb − SA,B,bidTb )/2
(13)
and the double summation in the objective function is taken with respect to all four
maturities (3, 5, 7 and 10 year) and all available instruments, tranches plus the index.
Note that the ETLs f(t, k) are entering the equation of the standardized mispricing (13)
of the tranches and indices via equations 9 and 10 respectively.
In Figure 11 we plot the ETL f(t, k) for a series of dates. We note that the surface
is not particularly smooth. To price a tranche on the same pool of credit references with
non standard attachment and detachment A and B we would need to obtain the expected
equity tranche losses (EETL) g(T,B) = Bf(T, 0, B) and g(T,A) = Af(T, 0, A). EETL
give a condition of no-arbitrage corresponding to requiring that the second derivative
of g(T,A) wrt A be non-positive, since this would be the opposite of the loss density
computed in A, as once can see by using a Breeden Litzenberger (1978) approach.
5.2 Numerical Results
Our sample pre-crisis goes from November 13, 2003 to June, 14 2006 for the CDX and
from June 21, 2004 to May, 23 2006 for DJ-iTraxx. From Table 4 we note that, except
for the Dj-iTraxx pool with a linear interpolation, in all other cases we find a solution
where the theoretical spread exceeds the bid ask spread by less than one fifth (0.4/2)
the bid ask range. In the case of the Dj-iTraxx pool with a linear interpolation we find
only one date where all instruments cannot be priced within the bid ask range: in this
case the theoretical spread is outside the bid ask spread by less than one third (0.6/2)
the bid ask range.
In all cases we find only few dates where we could not calibrate an EETL surface
within the bid-ask spread of each tranche plus the index. The few dates where market
instruments could not be priced exactly show a standardized mispricing that is extremely
small: the highest mispricing was obtained for the DJ-iTraxx using a linear interpolation:
the mispricing being only 0.3 times the bid-ask spread: 0.3 = (1.6− 1)/2.
5.3 Summary on Expected (Equity) Tranche Loss
The notion of ETL surface across maturity and tranche attachments is as close as a
model independent notion of implied dependence as possible, since it focuses on one of
the most direct market objects embedded in market quotes.
Rather than going through implied correlation, based on the arbitrary assumption
of a Gaussian Copula connecting defaults across names and leading to inconsistencies in
the temporal axis, one considers directly quantities entering the valuation formula and
implies them from market quotes given minimal interpolation assumptions. To make sure
that interpolation does not interfere excessively we carry out the calibration through two
different interpolation techniques (linear and splines).
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Figure 11: Expected Tranche Loss calibrated to the Dj-iTraxx 5 year and 10 year tranches
plus index.
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CDX DJ-iTraxx
Interpolation linear spline linear spline
Number of dates 616 616 473 473
% MisprBidAsk > 1 1.0% 2.6% 0.2% 1.3%
% MisprBidAsk > 1.2 0.8% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
% MisprBidAsk > 1.4 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0%
% MisprBidAsk > 1.6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 4: Percentage of sample repriced outside the bid-ask range. Sample data for CDX
range from November, 13 2003 to June, 14 2006, while for DJ-iTraxx from June 21, 2004
to May, 23 2006.
While in our framework the bid/asks of the instruments enter the target function
we aim at minimizing in order to imply the surface, in Walker’s (2006) framework the
instruments NPVs must be exactly zero. By including bid/asks as we do the no-arbitrage
constraints are satisfied across the vast majority of dates, in particular we find less
violations of the no-arbitrage condition than in Walker’s (2006).
The method appears to be helpful as a first model-independent procedure to deduce
implied expected loss surfaces from market data, allowing one to check basic no-arbitrage
constraints in the market quotes. It is also of immediate use to value tranches with non-
standard attachments and maturities and forward starting tranches, although excessive
extrapolation is to be avoided.
6 A fully consistent dynamical model:
the Generalized-Poisson Loss model
We finally turn to a full fledged arbitrage free and consistent dynamic loss model, im-
proving both on the implied copula through time consistency and also on ETL through
real dynamics. The Generalized Poisson Loss (GPL) model can be formulated as follows.
Consider a probability space supporting a number n of independent Poisson processes
N1, . . . , Nn with time-varying, and possibly stochastic, intensities λ1, . . . , λn under the
risk neutral measure Q. These intensities λj are intensities of defaults of sectors generat-
ing losses of size αj, and should not be confused with the single name default intensities
introduced earlier.
The risk neutral expectation conditional on the market information up to time t,
including the pool loss evolution up to t, is denoted by Et. Intensities, if stochastic, are
assumed to be adapted to such information. Define the stochastic process
Zt :=
n∑
j=1
αjNj(t), (14)
for positive integers α1, . . . , αn. In the following we refer to the Zt process simply as
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the GPL process. This process may be considered as the driving process either for the
cumulated portfolio loss L¯t or the default counting process C¯t.
6.1 Loss dynamics
The underlying GPL process Zt is non-decreasing and takes arbitrarily large values,
given large enough times. The actual portfolio cumulated loss and the re-scaled number
of defaults processes are non-decreasing, but limited to the interval [0, 1]. Thus, by
following Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006a,b), we consider the deterministic non-
decreasing function Ψ : N ∪ {0} → [0, 1] and we define the cumulated portfolio loss
process L¯t as
Lt := ΨL(Zt) := min(Zt,M
′), and L¯t :=
Lt
M ′
(15)
where 1/M ′, with M ′ ≥M > 0, is the minimum jump for the loss process. For example
we could choose M ′ such that 1/M ′ = (1− 0.4)/125. In case we want to allow for a finer
resolution of the loss we could choose instead M ′ such that 1/M ′ = (1− 0.4)/(2 · · · 125).
The related density (defined on integer values since the law is discrete) is
pLt(x) = pZt(x)1{x<M ′} +Q{Zt ≥M ′}1{x=M ′}
where the marginal distribution pZt of the process can be directly computed by means
of an inverse Fourier transform starting from the characteristic function ϕZt , which can
be explicitly calculated for some relevant choices of Poisson cumulated intensities distri-
butions, and it is given by
ϕZt(u) = E0[ exp(iuZt) ] = E0
[
exp
(
n∑
j=1
Λj(t)(e
iuαj − 1)
)]
Also the intensity of Lt, i.e. the density of the absolutely continuous compensator
of Lt (see for example Giesecke and Goldberg (2005)), can be computed directly and is
given by
hL(t) =
n∑
j=1
min(αj, (M
′ − Zt−)+)λj(t),
The intensity h goes to zero when Z exceeds M ′, which corresponds to total loss, as
expected. Further, if all the possible integer jump sizes between 1 and M ′ are allowed,
i.e. if αj = j and n = M
′, the intensity hL jumps whenever the cumulated portfolio loss
process L jumps.
Remark 6.1. The intensity jumps downwards, and this would seem to go in the opposite
direction with respect to self-excitedness, which is considered a desirable feature of loss
models in general. However, self-exciting features are embedded in our model, and they
are embedded in the possibility to have several defaults in small intervals, contrary to
most approaches to loss modeling.
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Remark 6.2. Since in the present paper we focus only on the calibration of CDO
tranches, which depend only on the loss marginal distribution, we address the readers to
Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006a,b) for an extensive analysis of candidate spread
and recovery dynamics, and to Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2007) for further dis-
cussion, including consistency with single names data, see also the full book by Brigo,
Pallavicini and Torresetti (2010). We point out that significant progress and testing in
loss modeling will be possible only when more liquid market quotes for tranche options
and forward start tranches will be available.
6.2 Model calibration
Since credit indices and CDO tranches depend only on the expectation of the portfolio
cumulated tranched loss (L¯t) and of the re-scaled number of defaults (C¯t), we avoid
to directly introduce stochasticity on the process intensities. We work with the basic
GPL model specification given by the driving GPL process Z in (14), which we use in
modeling the pool loss through (15). In this basic formulation each Poisson mode Nj
has a deterministic piecewise-constant intensity λj(t).
Given that we have modeled the pool loss L¯t directly, we do not characterize com-
pletely the re-scaled default counting process C¯t, but we give only its expectations.
Indeed, such expectations are the only information on default counting that are implicit
in Index market quotes (1), whereas tranche quotes (3) depend only on the loss and not
on default counting explicitly. We thus assume:
E0
[
C¯t
]
:=
1
1−R E0
[
L¯t
]
with 0 ≤ R < 1− E0
[
L¯Tb
]
where the range of definition of the constant R is taken in order to ensure that at each
time t the expected value of the re-scaled number of defaults is greater, or equal to,
the cumulated portfolio loss, and that both be smaller or equal to one. The parameters
calibrated in this version of the model are the αs and the λs. A detailed model calibration
can be found in Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006a).
6.3 Calibration results
The GPL model is calibrated to the market quotes observed weekly from May 6, 2005 to
October 18, 2005. We take R = 30%, following Albanese et al (2006), as reference value
for the recovery rate in the DJi-TRAXX Europe market for spot and forward contracts.
The quality of our calibration below is not altered if we select a valueR = 40% resembling
the recovery typically used in simplified quoting mechanisms in the market, see Brigo,
Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006a,b) and (2007) for some examples.
We consider, as a first example, the calibration date May 13, 2005. We list in the
upper panel of Table 5 the market data along with the calibration mispricings. Notice
that all tranches are priced within the bid-ask spread. Then, as a second example, we
switch to the calibration date October 11, 2005. We list in the lower panel of Table 5
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Maturities 3y 5y 7y 10y
Att-Det Π ∆ E Π ∆ E Π ∆ E Π ∆ E
Index 38 4 0 54 1 0 65 3 1 77 2 0
Tranche 0-3 2060 100 1 4262 118 8 5421 384 73 6489 124 -21
3-6 72 10 0 173 68 0 398 40 -8 590 20 1
6-9 28 6 0 57 6 0 141 17 -5 188 15 2
9-12 13 2 0 31 5 1 72 20 -3 87 15 6
12-22 3 1 0 21 3 0 42 13 -3 60 10 -3
Maturities 3y 5y 7y 10y
Att-Det Π ∆ E Π ∆ E Π ∆ E Π ∆ E
Index 23 2 0 38 1 0 47 1 0 58 1 0
Tranche 0-3 762 26 -2 3137 26 2 4862 76 -89 5862 74 157
3-6 20 10 1 95 1 0 200 3 1 515 10 -10
6-9 7 6 0 28 1 0 43 2 1 100 4 3
9-12 12 2 1 27 4 -3 54 5 -4
12-22 7 1 0 13 2 0 23 3 0
Table 5: DJi-TRAXX index and tranche quotes (Π) in basis points on May 13, 2005
(upper panel) and on October 11, 2005 (lower panel), along with the bid-ask spreads (∆)
and calibration mispricings (E). Mispricings exceeding bid-ask spreads are underlined. A
value of zero means a value below one basis point. Index and tranches are quoted through
the periodic premium, whereas the equity tranche is quoted as an upfront premium, see
Section 2.
the market data along with the calibration mispricings. This time some tranches are
mispriced.
For all calibration dates we find that the loss distribution implied by the GPL model
is multi-modal and the probability mass moves towards larger loss values as the maturity
increases. These features are shared by different approaches. For instance, static models,
such as the implied default-rate distribution in Torresetti et al (2006c) suggest multi-
modal loss distributions, as we have seen also here in our earlier sections on the implied
copula. The evolution of the implied loss distribution is shown in Figure 12. Further, we
notice that the values of the Poisson amplitudes are quite stable across the calibration
dates. Indeed, in six months we observe at most four changes in their values, see Brigo,
Pallavicini and Torresetti (2006b).
7 Application to more recent data and the crisis
In this section we check whether the critical features we discussed about implied corre-
lation and the subsequent elements coming from more advanced models are still present
in-crisis, after mid 2007. We will observe that the features are still present and often
amplified in the market after the beginning of the crisis.
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Figure 12: Loss distribution evolution of the GPL model with minimum jump size of
50bp at all the quoted maturities up to ten years, drawn as a continuous line.
7.1 Implied correlation in-crisis
We begin by extending the sample of the Compound Correlation invertibility analysis
to see if the non invertibility arose again during the market turmoil in 2007-2009. As
before, we resort to the homogeneous pool model.
In Figure 13 we show how since the credit crunch began in Summer 2007, the problem-
atic tranches changed. In fact the non-invertibility interested mainly for the DJ-iTraxx
the 10 year 12-22% tranche, and for the CDX the 10 year 10-15% and, marginally, the
10 year 15-30% tranches (see Figure 13).
Another relevant issue, besides non-invertibility of compound correlation, is its non-
uniqueness when invertible. We have seen in Figure 2 that on August 3, 2005 for some
tranches the map between correlation and theoretical tranche spread is not monotonic.
In particular we have seen how this resulted to be the case for the DJi-Traxx 10 year
6-9%tranche. Despite this map not being monotonic, on this particular date we did not
encounter the problem of having more than one compound correlation implying the same
theoretical spread.
We check whether there have been dates where a given tranche market spread could
be mapped into more than one compound correlation (and we did a similar analysis for
the CDX, not reported here). In Figure 14 we plot the market spread and highlight
with dots the dates when the market spread was invertible into two different compound
correlations for a few mezzanine tranches.
The problem of the non uniqueness of the compound correlation is particularly acute
for several mezzanine tranches, some of which are shown in Figure 14, for both maturities,
5 and 10 years, and for both regions, DJi-Traxx and CDX. Also for a given tranche
the problem of non uniqueness of the compound correlation can span a relevant time
window: for example the 5 year DJi-Traxx 3-6% compound correlation has not been
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Figure 13: DJi-Traxx (left charts) and CDX (right charts) 10 year Compound Correlation
Invertibility. Market spread (black line) versus minimum and maximum tranche spread
obtained varying the compound correlation between 0 and 1 (green lines). Red dots are
highlighting the dates and market spread that were not invertible (black line lies outside
the area within the two green lines).
uniquely invertible from March 2005 to October 2007.
Now we move on to base correlation. Overall, it surpassed compound correlation and
prevailed over more sophisticated dynamic loss models pre-crisis because:
• it could be calibrated to almost all market conditions experienced pre-crisis;
• it resulted in a smooth map, thus allowing for pricing of bespoke tranches via
interpolation;
• it could be used to define sketchy correlation mapping methods used for pricing
tranches on Bespoke CDO portfolios, where no other correlations were available,
see for example Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers’ reports by Reyfman et al.
(2004) and Baheti et al. (2007);
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Figure 14: Upper charts: DJi-Traxx 5 (left charts) and 10 (right charts) year Compound
Correlation uniqueness. Lower charts: CDX. Blue dots are highlighting the dates where
more than one compound correlation could reprice the tranche market spread.
• in its heterogeneous version it provided traders with easy to calculate hedge ratios.
In-crisis this perception was quite shaken. For example the finite pool heterogeneous
one-factor Gaussian copula base correlation often could not be calibrated to the 5 years
CDX Series 9 tranches during 2008.
When the 15-30% tranche spread cannot be calibrated this happens because the
30% detachment base correlation cannot be increased enough: the minimum attainable
theoretical 15-30% tranche spread obtained for a 30% detachment base correlation of
100% is above the 15-30% market tranche spread. This in turn occurs because the 15%
detachment base correlation is already so high that the 100% upper bound for correlation
values becomes a binding constraint.
In this respect we plot in Figure 15 the CDX 5 year Series 9 15-30% tranche market
spread (blue line) and the minimum tranche spread (grey dots) that could be calibrated
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Figure 15: Market spread and minimum attainable spread via heterogeneous base cor-
relation calibration for the 5 year CDX 15-30% tranche.
Figure 16: Heterogeneous (grey) and homogeneous (black) base correlation calibrated to
the 5 year CDX tranche spreads on December 7, 2007.
using the finite pool heterogeneous one-factor Gaussian copula base correlation from
September 2007 to May 2009.
We have thus seen that the heterogeneous base correlation had calibration prob-
lems on those dates where the 100% upper bound for the correlation became a binding
constraint. If we move to an homogeneous assumption, the homogeneous copula could
calibrate all the capital structure where the heterogeneous copula could not. In fact,
allowing heterogeneity may change considerably the shape of the loss distributions.
In Figure 16 we plot the 5 year CDX homogeneous and heterogeneous base corre-
lation calibrated to the market spread on the 7th of December 2007. We note that
heterogeneous base correlation could not calibrate the 15-30% tranche and we also note
that the homogenous base correlation is smaller than the heterogenous base so that the
100% upper bound for correlation was not reached.
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Remark 7.1. We mention that the deterministic recovery assumption, whilst being com-
putationally very convenient, does not help in the above setup. This has been addressed in
the base correlation framework by Amraoui and Hitier (2008) and Krekel (2008), among
others, who introduce random recovery. However, even with this update, base correlation
remains flawed and may still lead to negative loss distributions, and anecdotally there are
dates in-crisis where the heterogeneous pool base correlation with random recovery cannot
fit the market if such random recovery is imposed to be consistent with single name CDS.
For a formulation of random recovery as a function of the systemic factor in the Impiled
Copula framework see Remark 4.1
Summarizing, the heterogeneous version of the base correlation failed during the
recent credit crisis as market participants have not been able to calibrate it for a con-
siderable amount of time.
7.2 Implied copula in-crisis
Here we analyze the implied copula framework described in Section 4, showing the im-
plied loss distribution across time, so as to include the earlier examples as special cases
of our analysis of the implied loss through history, both pre- and in-crisis.
In Figure 17 we show the implied distribution for the default counting process, cal-
ibrated to the CDX and DJi-Traxx tranches (the entire capital structure except the
super-senior tranche) and the index for both the 5 and 10 years maturities from March
2005 to January 2009. We note how, since the beginning of the crisis, the probability
mass underlying the implied loss distribution shifted towards an higher number of de-
faults for both the DJi-Traxx and the CDX and for both maturities of 5 and 10 years.
This can be interpreted as an increased perceived default riskiness in general.
Also, we note how since the start of the crisis the probability mass associated to a
catastrophic or armageddon event, i.e. the default of the entire pool of credit references,
has increased dramatically. This is particularly visible for the 10 year default rate dis-
tributions for both DJi-Traxx and CDX. The increased probability of armageddon has
been pointed out also in Morini and Brigo (2007, 2009) in the context of credit index
options.
In Figure 18 we show a feature of the implied distribution that cannot be immediately
appreciated when inspecting Figure 17: the stability of the location of the modes in the
implied loss distribution through time.
Taking a snapshot of the implied distribution calibrated to the CDX 5 year tranches,
approximately every five months, in Figure 18 we note how the mode associated to about
20 names is quite constant in its location across all calibration dates. In particular, on
recent data, we note how even though the distribution shifts to the right, thus pricing
an increased risk of default of the pool, the location of the mode does not seem to
be affected. In particular we examine data on March 2008 and January 2009: despite
the massive shift to the right of the distribution, the non parametric optimization we
implemented still shows a clear mode that would be associated to a cluster of defaults
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Figure 17: Implied distribution calibrated with the Implied Copula, via a two stage
optimization as in Torresetti et al. (2006c), to the CDX and DJi-Traxx tranches for
both the 5 and 10 years maturities calibrated from March 2005 to January 2009. See
the full book by Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti (2010) for more details.
amounting to about 20 entities. This observation leads almost naturally to the GPL
dynamic framework outlined in Section 7.4.
7.3 Expected Tranche Loss surface in-crisis
The performance of the Expected Tranche Loss surface model in-crisis was not as egre-
gious as pre-crisis. This was in part due to the fact that with the super-senior tranche
available the system became over-determined. In fact the capital structure was com-
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Figure 18: Implied distribution calibrated with the Implied Copula, via a two stage
optimization as in Torresetti et al. (2006), to the CDX 5 year on-the-run tranches from
March 2005 to January 2009.
pleted17 and the super-senior expected loss did not just have to fit the index spread,
via the deterministic recovery, but had to retrieve both the index and the super-senior
tranche.
Adding the super-senior tranche to the set of market instruments in the optimization
of Equation (11) does not add any degrees of freedom in the variables whose function is
17Since the end of 2005 the liquidity of the super-senior tranche allowed us to include it in the set of
the calibration instruments.
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being optimized, while adding two instruments: one for each maturity.
With the addition of the super-senior tranche the unknown ETL of the 22-100%
tranche for example will not be calibrated to the index assuming a deterministic recovery
but will be calibrated instead directly to the super-senior tranche spread. The index will
then be a by-product of the calibration of all other tranches if one assumes a deterministic
recovery.
We will modify the ETL approach to calibrate all tranches including the super-senior,
thus spanning the entire capital structure, plus the index, by implying a deterministic
recovery which is piecewise constant in time. We set
(1−Rt)dC¯t = dL¯t ; Rt := R5y ∀t ≤ T5y , Rt := R10y ∀t > T5y
with R5y and R10y deterministic constants to be determined.
Furthermore, the objective function will be changed to penalize deviations of the
step-wise constant calibrated recovery from 40%, the market standard when pricing the
recovery of Senior Unsecured CDS, leading to
argmin
{R5y ,R10y ,f(5y,3%),...,f(10y,100%)}
100
∑
T
∑
A,B
(MISPRSTDZA,B)2 +
∑
T
(RT − 0.4)2 (16)
subject to constraints (12), where the standardized mispricing is given by
MISPRSTDZA,B =

(SA,B,theor0 − SA,B,bid0 )/SA,B,ba0 if SA,B,theor0 < SA,B,bid0
(SA,B,theor0 − SA,B,ask0 )/SA,B,ba0 if SA,B,theor0 > SA,B,ask0
0 otherwise
with SA,B,ba0 :=
1
2
(
SA,B,ask0 − SA,B,bid0
)
.
More in particular on all dates where the optimization set out in (11) results in a
standardized mispricing of any tranche or index for any maturity larger than zero, i.e.
the theoretical spread of any of the tranches or index for any of the two considered
maturities is outside the bid-ask spread, we will run the optimization set out in (16)
where, with respect to the optimization (11), we will introduce the piecewise constant
recovery rate, flat between time 0 and the 5 year maturity and then between the 5 and 10
year maturity. This will give us two additional degrees of freedom in the optimization.
In Figure 19 we plot for each date the calibrated piecewise constant recovery: the 5
and 10 year implied recoveries. We note that the above calibration has been implying a
lower recovery than 40% for the first 5 years, on those dates where a single fixed recovery
was not able to calibrate all tranches and the index. This is in line with the evidence that
recovery rates depend on the business cycle, recovery rates being lower during periods
of recessions. It is also consistent with the forecasts of a slower than expected economic
recovery as we move out of the current crisis.
7.4 Consistent dynamic loss model in-crisis
We resort now to the GPL model, to see how this model performs in crisis. We change
model formulation slightly, in order to have a model that is more in line with the current
51
Figure 19: Stepwise constant Recovery Rates implied from tranches and index market
quotes via the optimization set out in Equation (16).
market, while maintaining all the essential features of the modeling approach. Compared
with the model described in Section 6, we introduce the following modifications. We fix
the jump amplitudes α a priori. To do this, we reason as follows. Fix the indepen-
dent Poisson jump amplitudes to the levels just above each tranche detachment, when
considering a 40% recovery.
For the DJi-Traxx, for example, this would be realized through jump amplitudes
ai = αi/125 where
α5 = roundup
(
125 · 0.03
(1−R)
)
, α6 = roundup
(
125 · 0.06
(1−R)
)
, α7 = roundup
(
125 · 0.09
(1−R)
)
,
α8 = roundup
(
125 · 0.12
(1−R)
)
, α9 = roundup
(
125 · 0.22
(1−R)
)
,
α10 = 125
and, in order to have more granularity, we add the sizes 1,2,3,4:
α1 = 1, α2 = 2, α3 = 3, α4 = 4.
In total we have n = 10 jump amplitudes18. Eventually we obtain the set of amplitudes
αi ≡ 125 · ai ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 13, 19, 25, 46, 125}
Given these amplitudes, we obtain the default counting process fraction as
C¯t = 1{Nn(t)=0}c¯t + 1{Nn(t)>0} , c¯t := min
(
n−1∑
i=1
aiNi(t), 1
)
.
Now let the random time τˆ be defined as the first time where
∑n
i=1 aiNi(t) reaches
or exceeds the relative pool size of 1.
τˆ = inf{t :
n∑
i=1
aiNi(t) ≥ 1} .
18We then modify slightly the obtained sizes in order to account also for CDX attachments that are
slightly different.
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We define the loss fraction as
L¯t := 1{τˆ>t}(1−R)1{Nn(t)=0}c¯t + 1{τˆ≤t}
[
(1−R)1{Nn(τˆ)=0} + 1{Nn(τˆ)>0} (1−R c¯τˆ )
]
(17)
= 1{τˆ>t}(1−R)1{Nn(t)=0}c¯t + 1{τˆ≤t} (1−R c¯τˆ )
Notice that in this way whenever the armageddon component Nn jumps the first
time, the default counting process C¯t jumps to the entire pool size and no more defaults
are possible. Furthermore, whenever the armageddon component Nn jumps the first time
we will assume that the recovery rate associated to the remaining names defaulting in
that instant will be zero. The pool loss however will not always jump to 1 as there is the
possibility that one or more names already defaulted before the armageddon component
Nn jumped, and they defaulted with recovery R. If at a given instant t the whole pool
defaulted, i.e. C¯t = 1, this may have happened in two ways:
• Nn jumped by t. In this case the portfolio has been wiped out with the contribution
of an armageddon event. Notice that in this case dC¯t = dL¯t if Nn jumps at t. In
fact the recovery associated to the pool fraction defaulting in that instant will be
equal to 0.
• Nn has not jumped by t. In this case the portfolio has been wiped out without the
contribution of an armageddon event but because of defaults of more small or big
sectors that do not comprise the whole pool. Notice that in this case the loss is
less than the whole notional, as all these defaults had recovery R > 0.
In this way whenever Nn jumps at a time when the pool has not been wiped out yet,
we can rest assured that the pool loss will be above 1−R. We do this because the market
in 2008 has been quoting CDOs with prices assuming that the super-senior tranche would
be impacted to a level impossible to reach with fixed recoveries at 40%. For example
there was a market for the DJi-Traxx 5 year 60−100% tranche on 25-March-2008 quoting
a running spread of 24bps bid.
We know how to calculate the distribution of both C¯t and L¯t given that:
• the distribution of c¯t = min
(∑n−1
i=1 aiNi(t), 1
)
is obtained running a ’reduced’ GPL,
i.e. a GPL where the jump Nn is excluded.
• Nn is independent from all other processes Ni so that we can factor expectations
when calculating the risk neutral discounted payoffs for tranches and indices.
Concerning recovery issues, in the dynamic loss model recovery can be made a func-
tion of the default rate C¯ or other solutions are possible, see the recovery discussion in
Section 4.1 and also Brigo Pallavicini and Torresetti (2007) for more discussion. Here we
use the above simple methodology to allow losses of the pool to penetrate beyond (1−R)
and thus affect severely even the most senior tranches, in line with market quotations.
Let us now assume we are to price two tranches: 2-4.8% and 10-19.2%. The expected
tranche loss of these tranches, and ultimately their fair spread, will depend primarily on
the probability mass laying above the tranche detachment.
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Bearing this interpretation of the modes in mind we decided to choose the GPL
amplitudes by fixing the independent Poissons jump amplitudes to the level just above
each tranche detachment considering a 40% recovery. This led to the values α5, . . . , α10
above for our αs. With an eye to the richness of shapes of the Implied Copula historical
calibrated distributions, we added four amplitudes (from 1 to 4), corresponding to a
small number of defaults.
We now present the goodness of fit of the GPL just outlined through history. We
measure the goodness of fit by calculating, for each date, the relative mispricing:
MISPRRELA,B =

SA,B,theor0 − SA,B,bid0
SA,B,mid0
if SA,B,theor0 < S
A,B,bid
0
SA,B,theor0 − SA,B,ask0
SA,B,mid0
if SA,B,theor0 > S
A,B,ask
0
0 otherwise
where SA,B,theor0 is the tranche theoretical spread as in equation (3), where in the calcula-
tion of the expecations of both numerator and denominator we take the loss distribution
as resulting from the calibrated GPL.
In Figure 20 we present the relative mispricing for all tranches, for all maturities and
for both indices throughout the sample: from March-2005 to June-2009. We note that
while the 5 year tranches could be repriced fairly well in the current credit crisis for both
DJi-Traxx and CDX, the 10 year tranches calibrations for both indices have been sensibly
less precise following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Recently, with the stabilization
of credit markets we see again fairly precise calibration results (i.e. a relative mispricing
in the 2% to 4% range) for all tranches, both indices and both maturities.
To highlight where the problems in calibration come from, we have grouped mispric-
ings across three different categories:
• Instrument: we have grouped all tranches, independently of maturity and seniority,
in one group and we have put the remaining calibrated instruments, i.e. the 5 year
and 10 year indices, in the other group.
• Maturity: we have grouped all tranches and indices in two groups according to
their maturity: 5 and 10 years.
• Seniority: we have grouped all tranches (leaving out the indices) into three cate-
gories depending on the seniority of the tranche in the capital structure.
– Equity: equity tranche for both the DJi-Traxx and CDX
– Mezzanine: comprising the two most junior tranches after the equity tranche.
For the DJi-Traxx this means the 3-6% and 6-9% tranches, whereas for the
CDX this means the 3-7% and the 7-10% tranches.
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Figure 20: Relative mispricing resulting from the GPL calibration: DJi-Traxx (upper
panels) and CDX (lower panels).
– Senior: comprising the remaining most senior tranches. For the DJi-Traxx
this means the 9-12%, 12-22% and 22-100% tranches, whereas for the CDX
this means the 10-15%, 15-30% and 30-100% tranches.
From Figure 21 (and its CDX analogous not reported here) we note that the GPL
model produced calibrations that resulted in a relative mispricing that was larger (even
though of a relatively small magnitude) in the period from June 2005 to October 2006.
For both the DJi-Traxx and the CDX the mispricing could be ascribed to the 10 year
tranches, in particular the equity and mezzanine.
We also note that from October 2008 to June 2009 (in other words after the default
of Lehman Brothers), the GPL calibration resulted again in a non zero but still fairly
contained relative mispricing that in this case could be ascribed to both the 5 and 10
year tranches independently from their position in the capital strucuture.
8 Final discussion and conclusions
We have followed a long path for Credit Derivatives and CDOs in particular, from the
introduction of the Gaussian copula consistent at most with a single tranche at a single
maturity, to the introduction of arbitrage-free dynamic loss models capable of calibrating
all the tranches for all the maturities at the same time.
The critics we presented to the use of the Gaussian copula and of compound and
base correlation had all been published before the beginning of the credit crisis. Thus,
the notion that quantitative analysts and academics had no idea of the limits and dan-
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Figure 21: Relative mispricing resulted from the GPL calibration grouped by: Maturity
(5 and 10 years), Instrument type (Index and Tranches) and Seniority (Equity, Mezzanine
and Senior): DJi-Traxx.
56
gers underlying the copula model is simply false. There is even a book titled “Credit
correlation: Life after copulas” edited by Lipton and Rennie (2007) that is the summary
of talks given at a conference with the same name in 2006 in London.
Despite these warnings, the Gaussian copula model is still used in its base corre-
lation formulation, although under some possible extensions such as random recovery.
The reasons for this are complex. First the difficulty of all the loss models, improving
the consistency issues, in accounting for single name data and to allow for single name
sensitivities. While the aggregate loss is modeled so as to calibrate satisfactorily indices
and tranches, the model does not see the single name defaults but just the loss dynamics
as an aggregate object. Therefore partial hedges with respect to single names are not
possible. As these are crucial in many situations, the market remains with base correla-
tion. Furthermore, even the few models that could try and have single name consistency
have not been developed and tested enough to become operational on a trading floor.
Indeed, a fully operational model with realistic run times and numerical stability is more
than a prototype with some satisfactory properties that have been run in some “off-line”
studies. Also, when one model has been coded in the libraries of a bank, changing the
model implies a long path involving a number of issues that have little to do with mod-
eling and more to do with IT problems, integration with other systems, and the likes.
Therefore, unless a new model appears to be greatly promising in all its aspects, there
is reluctance in adopting it on the trading floor.
All these issues concurred in an unfinished research area. To this day there is no
fully-tested operationally satisfying and single name consistent dynamic model capable
of a consistent calibration of indices and CDO tranches across capital structure and
maturity. It is true that to some extent this is an unfinished problem. This does not
mean, however, that the quant community was unaware of the limitations of copula
models before the crisis, as we abundantly documented.
Where does this leave us more generally? Modeling is just one of the many elements
that may have contributed to the crisis, but certainly not the main one. As we broaden
the picture, the number of factors that have little or nothing to do with modeling and
that have been affecting the crisis becomes apparent. This helps us putting modeling
into perspective as we close the paper.
There are several articles already that are good references on the crisis. We cite
as a few examples quite different in nature Crouhy et al. (2008), Szego19 (2009), who
presents an analysis of the crisis along a path starting with the investors “feeding” on
19Szego, G. (2009), The Crash Sonata in D Major. To appear in the Journal of Risk Management in
Financial Institutions.
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their houses, NINJAs20, continuing with the frauds, partly documented by FBI21, the
problems of securitisation and of the originate-to-distribute system, the search for yield,
the reversal in the real estate markets, the absent supervision, and finally the inadequate
or wrong capital requirement rules and spillover effects. We also refer to El Namaki
(2009a, 2009b) for an analysis of managers performances and quality before and during
the crisis.
This is a good hint at illustrating the complexity of the crisis and the limited scope
and roles mathematics and methodology have had in it. It should be clear by now that
blaming mathematics for the sub prime fiasco, Lehman, Madoff, bail outs, unemployment
and one of the worst recessions in recent history is missing the point.
We hope this paper has contributed to this understanding through its methodological
journey and first hand witnessing of both the awareness some quants had of the models
limitations and their attempts to surpass them. We also hope our forthcoming book,
vastly expanding and updating this paper, will contribute to the debate. We believe the
steps we - and many other researchers - took to address models limitations even before
the crisis started are a good testimony of several Quants and Academics awareness and
good will.
20defined as “An informal term for loans made in the USA to aspiring home-owners with ’No Income,
No Job or Assets’ (NINJA). More formally known as subprime mortgage lending, these loans, and
the subsequent inability of many borrowers to repay them amid rising interest rates and falling house
prices, were largely responsible for setting off a global credit crunch in mid-2007”, The British Banker
Association, see http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=828&a=10646
21See for example the FBI Mortgage fraud report, 2007,
www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage fraud07.htm.
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